INQUIRY ®

MAGAZINE

MAY 14, 1979 • $1.25

Peter Dale Scott: *Assassination Cover-up*

Nat Hentoff: *Restraining* The Progressive

Reviews by Peter Stansky, Robert Sherrill

TENNESSEE-TOMBIGBEE

The Corps of Engineers' Biggest Swindle

By JOHNNY GREENE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yousuf Karsh reserves this space in his gallery of famous people for the person who discovers the cure for Muscular Dystrophy.

You can help. Send your contribution to the Muscular Dystrophy Association, 810 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INQUIRY®

MAY 14, 1979

The Corps of Engineers in Fantasy Land

JOHNNY GREENE **p. 13**

Billed by its supporters as the redemption of the South, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project has turned into "the biggest pork-barrel boondoggle of them all."

The Kennedy Assassination Cover-up

PETER DALE SCOTT **p. 18**

The House Assassinations Committee has concluded that more than one gunman fired at the President in Dallas. But the question remains: Why did the FBI and CIA cover up evidence of a conspiracy?

COLUMNS & REPORTS

Inquiries ..... **p. 3**
Hooverism lives; The nuclear dinosaur; War in Uganda

First Amendment Watch ..... **p. 7**
Stifling The Progressive. The case of *The Progressive* involves the highest stakes, but most of the nation's papers think it's "irresponsible" journalism that's on trial. (*NAT HENTOFF*)

Bread & Circuses ..... **p. 9**
Paying off the teachers. If Congress creates a Department of Education, Jimmy Carter will have paid off a campaign debt, but the rest of us will get stuck with the tab. (*PHIL STANFORD*)

Media ..... **p. 11**
What the press doesn't know about inflation. The American media's coverage of inflation is like the Leaning Tower of Pisa: narrow and slanted. (*JOHN L. HESS*)

Books ..... **p. 23**
Peter Stansky on *Christopher Isherwood: A Critical Biography*, by Brian Finney; Robert Sherrill on *Cover-Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941–1946*, by Bruce R. Bartlett; and Tom Hazlett on *The Environmental Protection Hustle*, by Bernard Frieden.

Film ..... **p. 30**
Stephen Harvey reviews *Hair*, directed by Milos Forman.

INQUIRY MAGAZINE (USPS 439-090), Volume 2, Number 11, May 14, 1979. Published semimonthly except for January, June, July, and August, when monthly. INQUIRY is published at 2525 E. Bayshore Road, Palo Alto, CA 94303. Second-class postage paid at Palo Alto, CA and additional mailing offices. Annual subscription price: $12.50; single copy price: $1.25. Overseas subscription price: $23.50 surface mail; $45.00 airmail. Address all editorial correspondence to INQUIRY, 1700 Montgomery St., San Francisco, CA 94111, (415) 433-4319. Send subscription requests and address corrections to: P.O. Box 2500, Menlo Park, CA 94025. POSTMASTER: Send address corrections to P.O. Box 2500, Menlo Park, CA 94025.

Copyright 1979 by Cato Institute.

ISSN No. 0148-5008.

A WORD FROM THE PUBLISHER

THE "PARTNERSHIP of business and government," which we are told is the keystone of our "mixed economy," is just dressed-up mercantilism. As the power of government grows, so do the efforts of those who would use that power to benefit themselves. The $4 billion boondoggle known as the Tennessee - Tombigbee Waterway Project, which Johnny Greene dissects in his article, "The Corps of Engineers in Fantasy Land," would never have come into being without an alliance of government and construction firms. So, too, it is becoming increasingly clear, with the nuclear power industry. Without the Atomic Energy Act and the Price-Anderson Act, which limits the liability of the nuclear industry, the near-catastrophe at Three Mile Island would never have occurred.

EDWARD H. CRANE III, Publisher

WILLIAMSON M. EVERS, Editor
RALPH RAICO, Senior Editor
MARK PAUL, Associate Editor
JONATHAN MARSHALL, Associate Editor
RUTH K. FRANKLIN, Copy Editor
ELIZABETH LAFFERTY, Assistant Copy Editor
MARINA HIRSCH, Research

MARY ANN GENDALL, Art Director
WENDY SCHWARTZ, Production and Layout
JENNIFER WALLACE, Production Manager
BRUCE MCGILLIVRAY, Staff Illustrator
JANIS COLLINS, SUSAN STROTMAN, CHRIS HUTMACHER, Staff

WILLIAM ABRAHAMS, BARTON J. BERNSTEIN, DIANE DIVOKY, PENNY LERNOUX, EARL C. RAVENAL, MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, PETER SCHRAG, WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, ROSE STYRON, THOMAS SZASZ, NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN, Contributing Editors; PHIL STANFORD, Washington Correspondent; STEPHEN HARVEY, Films; DANA GIOIA, Literature

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RES PUBLICA

Seventy-one nuclear plants did not leak radiation in Pennsylvania yesterday. Film at eleven.

■ Utility officials told a news conference in the nearby town of Hershey [Pennsylvania] that they believed too much emphasis was being placed on the negative parts of the accident, and not enough on the fact that safety systems built into the plant did prevent a catastrophic event.

—*New York Times, Mar. 30, 1979*

Let one hundred flowers wilt

■ Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping has reportedly accused some Chinese of having gone too far with the trend toward greater freedom of expression and democracy. . . . Mr. Deng was reported to have attacked those who had complained about human rights violations in letters sent to President Carter and the United States Ambassador, Leonard Woodcock. He said certain people had gone too far in demands expressed in posters.

—*New York Times, Mar. 23, 1979*

Make hay while the sun shines

■ A House subcommittee Wednesday voted unanimously to raise 1979 wheat and feed grain subsidies by 7%, despite the administration's opposition to any change in federal farm programs.

Rep. Glen English (D-Okla.), sponsor of the bill, said the 7% figure was chosen because that is the maximum wage increase allowed under President Carter's anti-inflation guidelines.

To those who pressed for higher increases, English said: "We have to grab while we have a chance."

—*Los Angeles Times, Apr. 5, 1979*

Or about business either

■ The "Un-Bureaucrat of the Year" could turn out to be the head of the Small Business Administration, A. Vernon Weaver. He has offered to give the Agriculture Department his agency's power to lend money to farmers, because SBA doesn't know much about farming.

—*U.S. News & World Report, Apr. 9, 1979*

Picky, picky

■ "You people don't seem to understand," said a [Yemen] Cabinet minister. "In the first place, it's not particularly comfortable for us to look like a client of the Americans when you have just negotiated a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. In the second place, all the noise gives the people in the south a perfect pretext to tell the Russians that they need more arms, too."

—*New York Times, Mar. 28, 1979*

Skal ja, scold no

■ As hard as six members of the Swedish Parliament pressed the arguments for the rod . . . 259 of their colleagues have voted for a law saying that, starting July 1, parents may not strike their children or treat them in any other humiliating way.

—*New York Times, Apr. 4, 1979*

Pay and pray

■ "There are obvious pitfalls [in giving arms to Egypt], and it makes a lot of us very nervous," said a Congressional aide with strong pro-Israeli views. "First of all, Egypt doesn't have a clearly established method of transferring power from one leader to another. There are few institutions of continuity. After Sadat, what happens? Who gets these weapons?"

"Sure there are pitfalls," said an Administration official in response. "We know the arguments. What happens after Sadat? But that's life. That's the Middle East. We have a great deal resting on Sadat. But we have a sense—maybe it's a prayer—that this will last and the arms will have a positive effect."

—*New York Times, Mar. 29, 1979*

■ "I think the Government ought to stay out of the prayer business," President Carter told a group of editors yesterday at the White House.

—*New York Times, Apr. 8, 1979*

Oh, go smoke a cigarette

■ Earlier today, Joseph A. Califano Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, told the Senate Health Subcommittee that so far the radiation that had leaked from the crippled reactor in Middletown was not expected to cause a single cancer death among the two million people living within 50 miles of the plant.

—*New York Times, Apr. 5, 1979*

The war for poverty

■ A bill introduced by [Representative Paul N.] McCloskey would require registration of all 17 year olds, male and female. They would have the choice of serving in a civilian capacity for one year or in the military for two or more, and would be allowed to defer such service until age 23.

The cost of such a program, McCloskey said, could be met by reducing the pay for junior enlisted personnel with less than two years of service to subsistence levels.

—*Los Angeles Times, Mar. 13, 1979*

Califano was the one in the three-piece suit

■ The Department of Health, Education and Welfare is withholding documents that show it spent more than $100,000—at least six times more than the $15,000 it admitted—in celebrating the department's 25th birthday last year, government sources said. . . .

The birthday party featured an outdoor celebration starring Big Bird of the HEW-financed Sesame Street television show and HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano.

—*Los Angeles Times, Apr. 10, 1979*

Not to worry

■ [Evan S. Dobelle, chairman of President Carter's reelection committee,] said that Mr. Carter's standing in public opinion polls did not trouble him because he thought the polls reflected "a society that doesn't trust politicians."

—*New York Times, Apr. 4, 1979*

For the record

■ On any given day next fall, 22,000 government employees will move themselves and their belongings around the country on the government's business and at the taxpayers' expense. Their travel will reach a rate of eight million trips a year with a price tag of $7.9 billion.

—*Washington Post, Mar. 13, 1979*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wanted: an FBI charter

Hooverism lives

WHEN JIMMY CARTER AND GRIFFIN Bell went to Washington in 1977, they promised to draw up a charter for the FBI that would prevent the kind of lawlessness the Church committee had exposed. Now, more than two years later, the administration is finally getting around to its promise. But there are disturbing indications that this administration is no more enthusiastic than its predecessors about controlling the FBI.

Consider the attitude of Attorney General Bell, who told senators at his confirmation hearing in 1977 that an FBI charter would be one of his highest priorities. Now Bell says, "I'm not keen on a charter for the FBI." Speaking last month before a conference of FBI special agents, Bell told his audience just what they wanted to hear: Everything is fine the way it is. "We're getting along mighty well, now," Bell said, citing changes in FBI procedures that are supposed to prevent the abuses of the past. "Once we get over in the Congress, I don't know what will happen to us," he went on. "So I've never agreed to the charter, the domestic charter. Ben and Judge Webster [Deputy Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti and FBI Director William Webster] agreed to it, because we had to send something over there. But my position is that I would just as soon not have it, so if some Senator or Congressman wants to add something to it that is restrictive, too restrictive, then I am going to say, 'Well, I'm against it. Let's just drop it, just forget it.' "

If Bell's words are disconcerting, so too has been the behavior of William Webster, the new FBI director. When Webster, a former federal appellate judge, took office a year ago, he was widely viewed as the perfect pin-striped antidote to the bureau's internal and public-relations problems. But during the past year Webster has championed FBI causes that should long ago have been abandoned, and he has become the spokesman for the Hooverites at the bureau, even when it has meant undercutting Carter administration policies.

Symbolic of Webster's attachment to the past was his decision last year to promote James B. Adams to the position of associate director, the number-two spot at the bureau. Adams, who will leave the bureau this month after having spent most of his career in various administrative jobs in the FBI's central headquarters, was highly unpopular with older field agents for his part in the irrational disciplines and petty tyrannies of the Hoover regime. (*Time* magazine quoted one unnamed agent as saying that he couldn't comment on Adams's appointment because he was too busy throwing up.)

There were also serious doubts about Adams's credibility. In mid-January it was reported that a former FBI agent, M. Wesley Swearingen, had submitted an affidavit to the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility in November 1977 accusing Adams of perjuring himself in sworn statements he gave in the long-running $40 million damage suit brought by the Socialist Workers party (SWP) against the bureau. This charge had far-reaching implications: Largely on the basis of Adams's statement that the bureau's informant program "is built upon an explicit promise of confidentiality in all cases," Attorney General Bell has refused to surrender the eighteen informant files sought by the SWP to bolster its contention that the FBI harassed and disrupted the party. According to Swearingen, who retired in 1977 after twenty-five years with the bureau, this pledge of confidentiality was "invented" by the FBI after the SWP filed suit, as it was standard FBI practice to instruct informants that they might well be called upon to testify in open court.

Swearingen also took issue with Adams's claim that informants' reports were the primary source of FBI information about the SWP. He said that much more was learned about the party's activities from various kinds of electronic surveillance, mail covers, and repeated surreptitious entries. Further, the affidavit stated that during Swearingen's time with the FBI, the bureau had scores of agents assigned to "bag-job squads" in Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Newark, New York City, and Washington, D.C.; their targets were mainly left-wing political organizations such as the Communist party, the SWP, and the Weather Underground. Swearingen indicated that Adams and other top FBI officials knew of the existence of these operations, and he accused the government of withholding the informant records from the SWP to prevent disclosure of "corrupt practices." "Certain present and former FBI officials are continuing a conspiracy to cover up the illegal break-ins against the Weathermen and others," said Swearingen.

Even before Swearingen's charges, the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility had been assigned by Bell to undertake an internal "administrative inquiry" to determine whether bureau officials, including Adams, deliberately lied to congressional investigators in 1975 about the extent of the FBI's illegal break-ins. Auditors from the GAO were told that there was no evidence that the bureau's black-bag jobs continued past 1966. In the spring of 1976, however, documents were found that showed that agents in the New York field office had still been conducting break-ins in 1972 and 1973. The discovery triggered a criminal investigation. Among those reportedly recommended for prosecution was James Ingram, the former head of intelligence for the FBI's New York office and now deputy assistant FBI director in charge of domestic-security and terrorism investigations. Questions about Ingram's exact role, and that of Associate Director Adams, are still unresolved, though FBI officials say that an internal investigation has cleared Adams of all charges.

Unfortunately, the public will never get a full accounting.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In April 1978, when Attorney General Bell announced the indictment of former FBI Director L. Patrick Gray and two high-ranking aides, he referred back to the FBI for disciplinary action the cases of sixty-eight agents—seven supervisors and sixty-one street agents—who had participated in the host of illegal break-ins, mail openings, and wiretaps conducted by the FBI's New York office while investigating the Weather Underground. Here was Webster's chance to break with the bureau's past. But in early December, Webster announced he would seek disciplinary action against just six of the agents. "The lessons have been learned," Webster said.

Clearly, administrative sanctions should have a broader reach than penalties provided for in a court of law, since a higher standard of conduct is expected from our public officials. It is Webster's contention, though, that sanctions should be administered only if they have a "therapeutic effect." He saw no such need for sixty-two of the agents in question.

Nor is this all. Webster's reluctance to crack down on the abuses of the past is matched by his desire to make it more difficult to punish FBI agents in the future. The director is supporting amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act that would shield FBI agents from citizen suits alleging FBI misconduct. He also wishes to limit government review of FBI disciplinary action, and has criticized Assistant Attorney General Barbara Babcock for suggesting that victims of FBI abuse should be able to cross-examine agents in these proceedings. And to protect the bureau from prying eyes, Webster wants all investigative files related to law enforcement to be exempt from Freedom of Information Act requests for ten years after they are closed. This blanket exemption would effectively remove the FBI from public scrutiny.

"The pendulum has swung too far," Webster has said. But the pendulum won't have swung far enough until we have a charter that will make FBI lawlessness a thing of the past. ❏

DOROTHY J. SAMUELS & JAMES A. GOODMAN

DOROTHY J. SAMUELS is executive director, and JAMES A. GOODMAN is Washington representative, of the Committee for Public Justice, a national civil liberties organization.

Accident at Three Mile Island

The nuclear dinosaur

WHEN THE "ATOMS FOR PEACE" program was launched in the early fifties, the technocrats in Washington presented a gleaming scenario: The United States would glide out of the age of oil, and into an era of clean nuclear energy virtually "too cheap to meter." It was foreordained by the high priests of a technological age: America would beat her atomic swords into plowshares.

But after the accident at the Three Mile Island plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the lies, the oversights, the blunders, and the tangle of legal privilege surrounding the nuclear industry have begun to unravel. The clear and present danger of leaking radiation has riveted mass attention to problems that have always been there to see. Journalists, pundits, and the public are now picking over the bones of an industrial dinosaur—the shaky economics, the forgotten or suppressed accidents, the near misses, the long history of subsidies—with a new sense of urgency.

The pattern that emerges is clear: Nuclear power was forced upon an unwilling and unready market. Economic and safety restraints were consistently circumvented or ignored by the promotional activities of government agencies with a vested interest in nuclear development. As an Energy Department official told *Business Week*, "The nuclear prophets just kept sweeping problems aside."

In a society that tends to associate nuclear power with nuclear weapons, the most sensitive problem, of course, has been reactor safety. This has been the subject of a noisy debate—the dispute has generated more heat than a nuclear reactor but less light than a 10-watt bulb—and in the wake of Three Mile Island the voices are sure to grow more shrill. (It can be only a matter of days before James Schlesinger begins distributing "NOBODY DIED AT THREE MILE ISLAND" bumper stickers.) Antinuclear groups already point to the growing evidence that nuclear regulators have neglected potential hazards pointed out by their own safety researchers; the nuclear industry has reminded us for the thousandth time that nuclear power plants are safer than crossing the street; and scientists are enlisting in the opposing armies.

But though the scientific argument over reactor safety may never end, the marketplace has already given firm signals that the risks of nuclear power outweigh its benefits. In the fifties, when utilities tried to get insurance for proposed nuclear plants, insurance companies shrank from the risk of a nuclear catastrophe that, according to 1957 AEC estimates, could result in 3400 deaths, 43,000 injuries, and $7 billion in property damage. Without insurance, manufacturers refused to sell, and the utilities refused to buy, nuclear reactors. Undeterred, the atomic zealots passed the Price-Anderson Act in late 1957. The act limited the liability for an accident to $560 million and provided a federal guarantee for potential liabilities private companies would not assume. When Price-Anderson was first passed, only $60 million of the liability was covered by private insurance; that proportion has risen to $475 million today. Yet while official estimates of worst-case damages have increased to 27,000 deaths, 73,000 injuries, and $17 billion in property damage, total liability is still limited to $560 million.

In 1977 Price-Anderson was challenged and ruled unconstitutional, but that decision was quickly reversed by the Supreme Court. The message of the Supreme Court could very well be made the slogan of nuclear power development: The "broad congressional purpose" of encouraging the private nuclear power industry "is ample justification" for abrogating the rights of nuclear victims.

Whatever the chance of a nuclear catastrophe—and after Harrisburg, the possibility can no longer be comfortably denied—the fact remains that without the Price-Anderson guarantee, nuclear power would be impossible. As the Atomic Industrial Forum admitted in its brief to the Supreme Court, "Removing the limitation on liability could cause utilities to refrain from completing pending projects, or undertaking new projects, and, conceivably, lead to the shutdown of existing reactors." If the nuclear industry cannot bear the risks it creates, why should they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be foisted on the rest of us?

This is just one example of the economic irrationality of a hothouse industry that rivals the defense sector in cost overruns, mismanagement, and inefficiency. Lured into buying nuclear plants by federal promises of reasonably priced, cost-effective facilities, utilities have frequently ended up paying twice the estimated cost for new reactors. The industry likes to blame these cost overruns on delays caused by government licensing procedures and environmentalist opposition, but studies by the Rand Corporation and the House Government Operations Committee have concluded that most of the delays are attributable to poor labor productivity, shortages, breakdowns, and difficulties in obtaining capital to build the plants. Although many antinuclear activists portray a nuclear industry willing to risk the nation's welfare for a few big profits, the truth is even worse: The industry has saddled us with expensive, inefficient, and possibly unsafe power plants, and lost piles of money to boot. General Electric dropped an estimated $600 million on its first thirteen reactor sales; Westinghouse faces nuclear losses of between $500 million and $2 billion; Babcock & Wilcox, designer of the infamous Three Mile Island Plant, has lost nearly $200 million; Atomic General went out of business in 1975; Combustion Engineering faces losses in nuclear sales of $150 million.

These losses come despite federal grants for research and development and despite the monopolistic structure of the utility industry. Utilities are protected from competition and are assured of a fixed percentage of profit, charged over and above their costs. In fact, many states have allowed utilities to charge customers for a nuclear plant while it is still under construction. "Construction Work In Progress" charges to ratepayers rose from $3.6 billion in 1966 to $26.3 billion in 1975, most of the increase reflecting the higher investment costs and longer lead times of nuclear plants. Also, private utilities receive substantial tax benefits when they invest in new equipment, giving them an incentive to build expensive, capital-intensive nuclear plants without much risk. If nuclear power has failed to flourish under these hothouse conditions, then something is wrong with the economics of nuclear power.

What's more, the full cost of one of the most expensive stages of the nuclear-energy cycle has yet to be borne by the industry: waste disposal. More than 5200 tons of lethal spent fuel are temporarily stored at power plant sites around the country. As the wastes pile up, permanent storage sites must be found, and there are many unanswered questions about safety. One thing is certain, though. It is the Department of Energy, not the utilities, that is pouring $449 million into disposal technology; the U.S. Geological Survey, not the utilities, that is searching for storage sites. As usual with nuclear power, the taxpayers are footing the bill.

On the surface, nuclear power had every reason to succeed. It commanded the best minds of a nation and higher budgets than any previous technology. It came equipped with armies of inspectors and regulators, reams of studies, congressional oversight, and public hearings. Nuclear power was "rational planning" just as the technocrats had always imagined it, the best that the centralized corporate state had to offer. Now, as a senior General Electric official candidly admits, "The existing nuclear industry can't survive. Period." Abandoned and desolate, a radioactive tomb fenced behind barbed wire and chain link, the Three Mile Island plant will be a fitting memorial to the hubris of technocracy and state planning, and a lasting reminder that industrial progress can't be bought at the expense of individual rights. ❏

More than one tyrant

War in Uganda

AS THE MIXED FORCE OF TANZANIAN troops and Ugandan exiles entered Kampala, the inhabitants showed keen insight: "Up with Nyerere, Down with Amin," they shouted. This scene epitomized the truth of the situation: Nyerere the hypocrite was administering the "medicine" he had long promised to forcefeed to Amin the butcher.

Idi Amin had a well-deserved reputation as one of the world's most brutal rulers. In late 1972 he expelled 50,000 Asians, who had provided the vital spark in the country's commerce. Estimates of the numbers of Ugandans killed since Amin took over in 1971 range from 50,000 to 300,000. As Amnesty International described the situation, "Persons arrested by any of the various security agencies are likely to be summarily executed by methods which include forcing one detainee to murder other detainees by hitting them on the head with a hammer, axe, or car cable." Amin specialized in persecuting Christians and the southern peoples of the country, and favoring Muslims and the Nilotic peoples.

In contrast, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere keeps thousands of political prisoners in his country's jails, has forcibly driven his country's peasants into collective farms, and has wrecked the economy. Yet he has secured massive foreign aid on the basis of his reputation as a saintly ascetic devoted to humanitarian concerns. Moreover, Nyerere has long preached the themes of pan-African unity and the inviolability of African borders. But to oust Amin, Nyerere sent long-range artillery and 4000 to 5000 Tanzanian troops across the border. The Tanzanian intervention is widely acknowledged to have been decisive in the fighting. The *Christian Science Monitor* reports that many Tanzanians want and now expect a preferential trade agreement with the new Ugandan government to help the troubled Tanzanian economy.

No one will shed any tears over the departure of Amin, bloody despot that he was. But the way in which Amin was brought down is illuminating. The United States, which had initially assisted Amin in coming to power, demanded that Amin withdraw from Tanzania, but never demanded that Nyerere quit Uganda. The American government openly welcomed Amin's fall and never berated Tanzania, though America had berated Vietnam for similarly invading Cambodia. Chalk up another instance of Carter administration hypocrisy and further evidence of America's alliance with China.

While no one should mourn for Amin, the fact that he was brought down by Tanzania sets a calamitous precedent. For the first time in the postcolonial era, the army of one African country has invaded another to oust its ruler. Now that a leader of Nyerere's stature has breached the rule of self-restraint, it will be difficult to put the demon of war back in the box. ❏

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS

Letters to the editor should be addressed to INQUIRY Magazine, 1700 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, California 94111. The editors reserve the right to edit letters for length when necessary.

Damaging the community

IN TOM HAZLETT'S "A CASE of coastal piracy" [*INQUIRY*, Mar. 19, 1979] we learn that poor Mr. Osui bought "several acres of inexpensive land" in 1946, and the Coastal Commission did not allow him to "recover the full market value of his 30-year investment." That is, the commission did not allow him to "recover" perhaps twenty or thirty times what he originally paid for the land by developing it in a way that would damage the community as a whole.

It is odd that Tom Hazlett, a graduate student in economics, has apparently never heard of the theory of externalities. It was recognized as early as the 1920s that it is possible to develop land in a way that profits its owner but is detrimental to the community as a whole. Someone building a factory in a residential neighborhood, for example, might increase the value of his own property but decrease the value of adjoining properties to such an extent that the community's total property value is less than it was before the factory was built. The damage that development does to the coast cannot, of course, be measured in such simple pecuniary terms, but it is very tangible and real.

Hazlett concentrates on the shortage of housing in California but overlooks the equally severe shortage of open space—the long waiting lists (of people of all economic classes) to get into the state's parks—and he seems totally ignorant of the possibility of concentrating new housing in already developed areas, the "infill" development advocated by many city planners as a way of providing housing without aggravating sprawl. He poses a couple of examples to "prove" the ludicrous assertion that the coast can be saved through private covenants, ignoring the preponderance of examples to the contrary and the basic defect of the market in this respect: that a person deciding whether to build will consider only the costs and advantages of his project to himself and will ignore its external effects on the community as a whole.

When a million people move to the coast to enjoy it themselves, each ignoring the effect of his move on others, the result is that there is nothing much left for anyone to enjoy. At any rate, only a small percentage of Californians, a small "elite," could live on the coast even if there were no restrictions on building; but the majority can use public lands.

CHARLES N. SIEGEL
Berkeley, Calif.

TOM HAZLETT replies: Lest readers worry that all of California's coastline is in the hands of greedy developers who are ruining the environment, it should first be noted that, of California's 1072 miles of coastline, 418 miles—roughly the equivalent of the East Coast between Boston and Asbury Park, New Jersey—are public lands. At issue here is whether the future of the rest of the coast will be determined by the commission or the citizens who own the land.

Mr. Siegel would use the issue of externalities to cut off new development on the California coast, but it is in fact a two-edged blade he wields. True enough, new development on the coast may lower the value of properties already developed. But prohibiting new growth would create windfall gains for established owners. The problem is entirely reciprocal. In his selective half-economics, Mr. Siegel, like the coastal commissioners, would have us consider only the externalities hurting current residents of the California coast. We are apparently supposed to ignore the social consequences, amply demonstrated in my article, of such blind defenses of the status quo.

But his crude argument will not soon die, because it offers politicians an intellectual alibi for the "obvious" solution: government regulation to "solve" the externalities problem. If Mr. Siegel still believes, after reading my article, that a public body like the Coastal Commission can serve as an unbiased mechanism for weighing the various uses of a scarce resource, it proves once again that religious faith can be maintained in the face of all evidence to the contrary.

On the beach

TOM HAZLETT'S ARTICLE about the "piracy" on the California coast [*INQUIRY*, Mar. 19, 1979] is well written and well documented and I would subscribe to every word in it. Prices along the coast have skyrocketed: The last lots at Bodega Harbor, originally offered at $25,000 to $40,000, have sold at prices from $125,000 to $250,000. This is for the land only. The new elite population is now, of course, anxiously opposing, with their vote, any additional development. The smaller landholders are quickly squeezed out (at the right price) to escape the cost of maintaining a property that is overburdened with the annual cost of taxes.

K. LEWIS
San Francisco, Calif.

Freedom to write

THROUGH THE OFFICE OF the Freedom-to-Write Committee of the PEN American Center, Allen Ginsberg has initiated a study of the influence of government in the life of writing in this country since World War II. Much of the material for the report has been gathered by Mr. Ginsberg through the Freedom of Information Act and through research of the files compiled by the Senate and House committees investigating the intelligence agencies.

This report will focus on the intrusion of government in the intellectual life of this country. It will discuss the possible infringement on First Amendment rights of writers and publishers in the United States.

For the purposes of this report, we would appreciate hearing from anyone who has information concerning the interference of any government agency in the writing, publishing, or distribution of a work. In addition, any information concerning government participation in the work of independent cultural foundations or institutions would also be greatly appreciated.

GEOFFREY RIPS
PEN American Center
47 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIRST AMENDMENT WATCH

NAT HENTOFF

Stifling the Progressive

ROBERT WARREN, ABOUT to take his place in American constitutional history as the first judge to censor the press by imposing a preliminary injunction, was properly grave. The woeful face of his law clerk, a young woman of firmly opposite views, had already signaled what was going to happen on that March 26 morning in the federal district courtroom in Milwaukee. The judge, ready to assume what he rightly called his "awesome responsibility," declared:

"Stripped to its essence . . . the question before the Court is a basic confrontation between the First Amendment right to freedom of the press and national security." In this instance, Judge Warren averred, the First Amendment must be drastically and substantially curtailed, because if the embattled *Progressive* were to be allowed to publish its article on the hydrogen bomb, the way could be paved "for the thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to publish becomes moot."

Judge Warren, however, made one last try to avoid imposing prior restraint on the magazine. He suggested that a mediation panel be assembled to see if both sides could agree to certain deletions of technical material that might allay the government's fear that a nuclear holocaust would result from the publication of this article on the design and production of the H-bomb.

The Progressive declined the invitation. Later, its editor, Erwin Knoll, told me why: "I don't believe that the First Amendment is negotiable. If the founders had intended it to be negotiable, they would have written a mediation process into the Constitution."

Besides, as Knoll pointed out, Judge Warren had offered his mediation proposal *after* he had made it clear he was going to give the government the preliminary injunction it was so ardently pursuing. "There was no incentive whatever for the government to yield anything," said Knoll, "because it already knew we were enjoined."

But what of the pleas to *The Progressive* by certain members of the press itself—notably the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*—that it voluntarily omit the details to which the government objects, thereby avoiding the appalling risk of going all the way to the Supreme Court and having Judge Warren's act of prior restraint enshrined in precedent and in law? After all, there are only some 1300 words in dispute.

"First of all," Knoll answered, "we are simply not going to collaborate in the process of censorship. Second, we have been maintaining all along that despite what the government says, there are *no* secrets in this article. Our reason for printing it is to show how much unnecessary secrecy is being maintained in the name of national security, with the result that Americans are deprived of information they very much need concerning such issues as environmental hazards, occupational health and safety risks, arms control and disarmament negotiations, and federal spending priorities. So, if we were to dicker about the 1300 words, we'd be saying in effect that there *are* some secrets in this article after all. This whole thing reminds me of what I. F. Stone said about Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War: 'He's not content to be commander in chief. He wants to be editor in chief too.' That's about the situation we're in here. The government wants to be in editorial charge of *The Progressive*."

AND SO THE LONG-TERM battle has been fully joined. The next stop is the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and then, ineluctably, the United States Supreme Court. A major issue will be the constitutionality of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which forbids the communication, transmission, or disclosure of any "Restricted Data" by anyone "with reason to believe such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to secure advantage to any foreign nation." Moreover, the act specifically empowers the government to try to block the communication of "Restricted Data" by injunction or other forms of restraint. This will be the initial test, on First Amendment grounds, of the Atomic Energy Act. And the government devoutly hopes its constitutionality will be upheld.

The government will present a corollary argument in this case, one that thoroughly freezes the First Amendment—the concept of "Born Classified." Under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the government insists, *all* data—including lawfully obtained information—concerning the design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons is "restricted." It doesn't matter whether the data are in the government's possession or not. Therefore, as *The Progressive* points out in one of its briefs, "A journalist's 'original work product,' a private scientist's independent research, a university professor's deductive reasoning can all be 'classified at birth.' " The government does not have to notify the scientist or journalist that he is the bearer of "Restricted Data" because *everything* concerning the design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons is automatically classified unless the government declassifies it. (More on the constitutional issues in my next column.)

This case, therefore, involves the highest First Amendment stakes in the history of the republic. And yet, from my own reading of the papers and from what a *Newsweek* researcher has told me about reports from that magazine's bureaus, the attitude of the majority of the press reveals either extensive ignorance of the issues or such fearful paralysis that the prevailing wish seems to be that *The Progressive* succumb to the government because "the present judicial climate" is hostile to the First Amendment. (Let alone hostile to a publication so reckless and witless as to spread about these horrendously dangerous government "secrets.")

To begin with, some papers just fell for the government's line. Energy Secretary James Schlesinger telephoned a number of publications soon after a

NAT HENTOFF writes a monthly column on civil Liberties for INQUIRY. His recent books include Does Anybody Give a Damn? *and* Jazz Is.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

temporary restraining order was imposed on *The Progressive* on March 9. (The second in the nation's history; the first, in 1971, having been directed against the *New York Times*'s publication of the Pentagon papers.) Schlesinger strenuously warned that the article would enable untold numbers of foreign nations to learn how to produce nuclear weapons much more quickly and thereby escalate the risks of nuclear war. Without checking with *The Progressive* or waiting to see its court papers, a sizable segment of the press accepted this government claim, whether personally argued by Schesinger or not.

The *Washington Star* assured its readers that *The Progressive* "has presented the Government with a nearly flawless case for prior restraint." Also censuring the magazine for its irresponsibility were Ben Bradlee, editor of the *Washington Post*; Bob Clark, executive editor of the *Louisville Courier-Journal* and *Times*; and Reg Murphy, publisher and editor of the *San Francisco Examiner*. *Editor & Publisher* kept wishing it were all a bad dream and urgently counseled *The Progressive* to roll over. Also advising a hasty retreat from the courts were syndicated columnist James Kilpatrick; Jack Landau, head of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press; and other journalists convinced that discretion was far more desirable than First Amendment valor. Said the *Los Angeles Times*: "It is the wrong issue, at the wrong time, in the wrong place."

The editorial most contemptuous of *The Progessive*'s position was that of the *Washington Post* on March 11. The headline: "John Mitchell's Dream Case." Uncritically accepting the government's claim that the magazine's article did contain secret data, the *Post* warned heavily that "this is a real First Amendment loser."

On March 28, after the temporary restraining order against *The Progressive* had been hardened into a preliminary injunction, the *Washington Post* did allow that the judge had acted unconstitutionally, but once again asserted—without proof—that the article includes "properly classified information" and *The Progressive* ought to get that information out of there.

Not all the voices of the press were shaking. The *New York Times*, after a stumbling start, finally decided that the real case here is "against the national interest—against free speech and inquiry." Also of that view were, among other papers, the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. And by the end of March, a doughty troop of smaller publications had declared their support of *The Progressive*: *The Nation*, *Village Voice*, *Harper's*, *Atlantic Monthly*, *Ms.*, *Scientific American*, *Seven Days*, *Working Papers*, *New Republic*, *Mother Jones*, *Inquiry*, *WIN*, *Texas Observer*, *The Black Scholar*, *Science for the People*, *Dollars & Sense*, *Politics Today*.

However, the majority of the nation's newspapers still pretty much reflect the view of *Editor & Publisher*: "It is a bad case that will make bad law . . . and it is already apparent that the press is going to be blamed for something many responsible segments were opposed to." (Not a single news organization has, as of this writing, filed an *amicus* brief on *The Progressive*'s behalf.)

The consensus is that the case against The Progressive is seen as a weapon by which Congress may be persuaded to pass an Official Secrets Act.

By this standard, it is "irresponsible" journalism, not the First Amendment, that is on trial here. I doubt that Erwin Knoll would really want a jury of his peers when testimony begins.

*BUT HOW "IRRESPONSI-*ble" is this fabled article, "The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It?" Well, we are not—so far—allowed to read it, but it is possible to examine how it was researched and even to get a reasonable sense of what's in it. The writer, 36-year-old Howard Morland, was an air force transport pilot in Vietnam. He later became a commercial pilot and a carpenter. Until Morland started this piece, his knowledge of the field was limited to five college courses—two in chemistry, two in physics, and one in quantum mechanics—at Emory University, where he was graduated in 1965.

In the course of researching the article, Morland gave himself a cram course in nuclear physics from undergraduate textbooks and from discussions with professors, mostly at MIT. He also took government-guided tours of nuclear plants, where he interviewed scientists—with government approval. He talked with other nuclear experts and intensively read literature that was entirely in the public domain. Morland had no access to secret data, nor does the government claim he tried to steal any. Nothing was done surreptitiously in the entire course of gathering information for the piece.

The article itself—so far as I can tell from a lengthy and partially censored affidavit by Morland, affidavits by nuclear scientists, and my own sources—is *not* a do-it-yourself guide to building the H-bomb. It does give an account, as Morland says, of "the overall design concept, the essential parts and how they relate to each other."

Dr. Theodore Postol, a government nuclear scientist at the Argonne National Laboratory—one of the very few who *have* read the article—emphasized in a court affidavit that the piece "contains no information or ideas that are not already common knowledge among scientists, including those who do not have access to classified information." And, Postol gives a clue that lets you see the essence of the article for yourself: "It contains no ideas or information which could not be readily concluded or obtained by any competent physicist after seeing the diagram prepared by Edward Teller for his article in the *Encyclopedia Americana* (Vol. 14, p. 655, 1977)."

After all, as Teller himself, the very creator of the H-bomb, said after the government detonated its attack on Morland, "What is known to a million people is not a secret."

Then why the furious rush to censor? Among people much experienced in the maneuvering of the national-security priesthood, the strong consensus is that the case of *The Progressive* is seen as a most valuable weapon by which Congress may be persuaded to pass an Official Secrets Act—thereby tightening even further the insiders' control of all manner of nuclear-related information. And even if the legislation is not passed, these guardians of secrets believe that they have already gained a great deal by Judge Warren's ominous precedent.

Should the Supreme Court solidify that precedent, a prediction by John Buell, associate editor of *The Progressive*, is more than likely to be fulfilled:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"If H-Bomb proliferation can be successfully portrayed as a problem of keeping a 'secret,' Government elites can maintain the illusion that merely guarding this secret will keep us secure. That way, they can head off the notion that our only real security lies in preventing the political and economic decisions which make bombs possible. And they can block the needed political and economic changes which will not be made unless the United States and the four other members of the nuclear club are willing to sacrifice their own obsession with the nuclear arms race."

As it turns out, *The Progressive*'s fight to be free to publish Howard Morland's article is indeed a matter of life or death. But not in the way Judge Robert Warren has drawn those eschatological lines. Howard Morland clarifies this point precisely in a March 26 Op-Ed piece for the *New York Times*, in which he tells of the navy's plans to store nuclear weapons in igloos that will be placed near the Honolulu airport. Environmentalists and others opposing the stacking of nuclear bombs in so highly vulnerable a place have brought suit demanding the government prepare an environmental impact statement for this macabre scheme.

Testifying in federal court in Honolulu, a Department of Energy information-classification specialist said the navy could not even discuss the environmental impact of nuclear-weapons storage. Why, to do that would be to violate security classification rules. Would an airplane crash near the igloos scatter radioactive material? The public is not allowed to know, because the answer would reveal nuclear-weapon-design information. And the basis for this total secrecy, the witness emphasized, is the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Just trust the government.

Morland notes that Dr. George Kistiakowsky—a physicist who was much involved in the development of the atomic bomb—told him last October, while he was researching the *Progressive* article, that the nuclear establishment in America "is like a monastic order. Its members live off the larger society but are not part of it. They surround themselves with a wall of secrecy." It is vital, Kistiakowsky says, that their activities be opened up to public scrutiny.

And that is what *The Progressive* thought it had the First Amendment right to do. ❑

BREAD & CIRCUSES

PHIL STANFORD

Paying off the teachers

*THE PROPOSAL TO ESTAB*lish a cabinet-level Department of Education, now being considered by Congress, is nothing more nor less than the payoff of a campaign debt owed by Jimmy Carter to the National Education Association. During the campaign, the NEA—which represents 1.8 million of the nation's 2.2 million primary- and secondary-school teachers and ranks as the second largest union in the country—endorsed Carter and contributed not just money but its considerable political organization to his election. No less an authority than Carter's campaign manager Hamilton Jordan has said the support of the teachers was "crucial to our winning." All they asked in return was their own cabinet post.

To hear the supporters of the measure as they testify before Congress these days, creating the new department would be little more than an exercise in administrative efficiency. According to James T. McIntyre, Jr., director of the Office of Management and Budget, consolidating into a single department the education programs currently operated by HEW and five other federal agencies would form a "simpler, more accountable organization than now exists." Or, as the NEA so gracefully puts it, the department would "provide an efficient administrative structure for the streamlining of the widely scattered education functions of the federal government, for the simplification of these programs. . . ."

We may rest assured, however, that the NEA has not been lobbying so strenuously for a Department of Education simply because it has a soft spot for government efficiency. Reorganization, the establishment of new jurisdictions within the government, inevitably means the redistribution of power—and the proposal to organize a new Department of Education is surely no exception to this rule. As Rich Jaroslovsky of the *Wall Street Journal* has explained, "Under the current setup, the NEA is only one of many big special-interest groups seeking to influence HEW policies. But in a smaller, separate Department of Education, the group's presence and influence would be greatly magnified." For example, the American Federation of Teachers, the NEA's smaller and less powerful rival, opposes the creation of a new department for precisely this reason.

Like all standard political explanations, this tells us how but it does not answer why: Why, precisely, does the NEA want a Department of Education? And what does it plan to do with it once it gets it?

To date, opponents of the proposed Department of Education have argued against it on the ground that it would lead to the federal control of educational policy. This argument has been used mainly by conservatives who fear, rightly enough, that the generally liberal educational establishment could use the new department to promote its favorite social programs.

Of course. Consolidating all federal education programs in a single Department of Education would result in greater federal involvement in educational policy. How could it not? The only mistake would be to suppose, as did the authors of an opinion piece that appeared in the *Washington Post* last August, that "a Cabinet-level department is a backdoor way of *creating* a national education policy, of breaking with the long tradition of a limited federal involvement in education and of virtually no federal responsibility for schools and colleges themselves." As Joel Spring has demonstrated, most recently with his book *The Sorting Machine*, education has actually been considered a tool of national policy in the United States at least since World War II. Over the past

PHIL STANFORD is Washington correspondent for INQUIRY.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If a Department of Education is created, Carter will have paid off his campaign debt to the NEA.

quarter-century Washington has increasingly determined the course of educational policy. The National Defense Education Act of 1958, which was an attempt to "catch up with the Russians" after Sputnik by encouraging more science courses, and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which created new programs for the education of the disadvantaged as part of the War on Poverty, are the two most obvious examples of this involvement. There is, furthermore, no reason to doubt that the establishment of a national Department of Education would accelerate this trend, or that, given the NEA's influence in such a department, NEA's special concerns—from career education to the metric system—would become the priorities of the nation's schools.

BUT THIS HARDLY SEEMS an adequate explanation for the NEA's obsession with a Department of Education (any more than it is a persuasive political argument against the creation of such a department). Nobody ever gets very excited about more of the same. No, the real reason concerns something infinitely more important to the NEA and its membership than mere educational policy, and if it has been overlooked in the debate so far, it's hardly the NEA's fault. It is spelled out in the current *NEA Handbook* for anyone who cares to look. However, even without this convenient revelation, it shouldn't have been too difficult to figure out.

The NEA today represents an overextended industry. Since the peak year of 1970–71, enrollment in the nation's public schools has dropped 7 percent, from 42.4 million to 39.4 million. At the same time, the number of public school teachers has continued to increase. During the past decade the number of elementary and secondary teachers has gone up 13 percent; over the same period their average salary, which is now $15,615, has risen 88 percent.

These facts alone would spell trouble. However, on top of everything, the teaching industry is faced with a tax revolt, which to date has been most effective at the state and local levels. As it happens, state and local governments are also the source of most of the revenues that go to pay for public schools. According to statistics published by the NEA, the total cost of operating this country's public schools this year will be $86 billion. State governments will provide 47 percent of that total, local governments 44 percent (for a combined total of 91 percent), and the federal government 8.8 percent.

When you consider these two sets of statistics together, the NEA's desire to establish a Department of Education begins to make more sense. The following passage, from NEA president John Ryor's introduction to the latest *NEA Handbook*, leaves no room for doubt:

> [T]here are currents of change on the public scene that have profound implications for education and America.
>
> One sign of change is the widespread sentiment for reduction of property taxes and other forms of state and local taxation that have traditionally financed public education. . . . The implications for public education, the foundation of the nation's future, are enormous.
>
> The solution lies in a massive infusion of federal funds into public education. The federal government, with its greater, more equitable taxing power, must assume more of the financial responsibility for the schools. We teachers must reaffirm our commitment to the NEA's long-standing legislative priority—one-third federal funding of public education.
>
> The establishment of a separate cabinet-level Department of Education is vital in the situation in which public education finds itself today. Such a department will be better able to ensure increased funding. . . .

Ryor's statement is so straightforward it needs no explanation. The real issue behind the NEA's campaign is money, and lots of it. Even if the NEA fails to achieve its goal of "one-third federal funding of public education," a Department of Education controlled by the NEA could end up costing billions of dollars. That is the issue Congress should be debating before it votes on the new cabinet office.

This is the second time Carter has submitted legislation to establish a Department of Education. Last year the measure sailed through the Senate, 72 to 11. However, it got stalled in the House and died when the 95th Congress adjourned. The NEA says it would have passed if it had been brought to a vote. This session, supporters of the new department are confident. Vice President Mondale has even promised a signing ceremony in the Rose Garden before the 96th Congress is over.

If this comes to pass, Jimmy Carter will have paid off his campaign debt to the NEA and it won't have cost him a cent. As usual in these matters, the rest of us will have to pick up the tab. ❑

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MEDIA

JOHN L. HESS

What the press doesn't know about inflation

LOUIS ALTHAZAR OF LAVAL University in Québec has observed that the American media are like the Leaning Tower of Pisa: narrow and slanted. Nowhere is this more evident than in the coverage of inflation.

When a journalist seeks guidance on this question, he turns to an exclusive club of economists employed by a few banks and certified institutions. For balance, he characterizes the Republicans among them as conservatives, and the Democrats—like Arthur Okun, who helped Lyndon Johnson finance the Vietnam War with funny money—as liberals. But basically, these experts agree with one another to the decimal point. And to a man, they have missed every major turn in the economy in recent decades.

This can be frustrating. In December 1972, the *New York Times* assigned me to ask four of the most respected authorities to review the outlook for the new year. They were selected by an editor to reflect the full range of economic philosophy, from the liberal Henry Kaufman to the rightist Alan Greenspan.

The breadth of this spectrum is suggested by the fact that Dr. Kaufman was a partner in Salomon Brothers, an investment house then making piles by peddling the tax-exempt bonds of New York City, among others. Its chief was William Simon, who would leave just before that bubble burst, to head the Treasury under President Ford. Alan Greenspan, of course, became Ford's chief economic adviser.

While Simon and Greenspan were in Washington, the national debt soared by more than $200 billion, a record. Back in civilian life, Simon hired a ghost and perpetrated a best seller called *A Time for Truth*, which says liberal politicians are wrecking the country by deficit spending. This caused me to observe that a time for truth is when the Republicans are out of office. As for Greenspan, when he was pressed on a recent TV panel to explain why Republicans in office didn't practice what they preached, he replied, "The relationship between ideas and action is a distant one."

In December 1972, the relationship between ideas and reality proved to be a distant one. For the setting, keep in mind that the economy was then booming, with a flood of new money pumped in by that hard-money enthusiast Arthur Burns of the Federal Reserve, in good time to help the reelection of Nixon. Things looked good that year: Prices rose only 3.4 percent under compulsory controls.

My four seers were uniformly euphoric. Indeed, I could have saved time by interviewing any one of them and multiplying by four. To my banal opening question, whither the economy in 1973, all rattled off the same happy numbers, within one percentage point, for the gross national product, the Dow-Jones industrials, interest rates, and unemployment.

"There are no financial restraints on the economy," Dr. Kaufman told me.

"It's very rare that you could be as unqualifiedly bullish as you can now," Greenspan said.

All four looked surprised when, late in each interview, I asked about inflation. All thought that was a *European* problem.

"In fact," said Albert T. Sommers of the National Conference Board, "the American analyst is comforted by it."

The thought here was that rising prices in Europe would spur American exports. The same reasoning caused the *New York Times*, exactly five years later to the day, to declare that the crash of the dollar had "been a blessing, not a curse."

Sommers, the dean of American analysts of the business cycle, assured me that the government had that cycle well in hand. "Now it's a science," he told me. By that same token, he said modestly, business forecasting had become "pretty good," and the outlook for 1973 was "very good."

Two months later, Arthur Burns's new money hit the fan. In a monetary panic, Nixon was forced to devalue the dollar and end the last semblance of monetary stabilization. That summer, the United States entered the worst recession since the 1930s.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE that the club of economists has learned anything from that experience, nor from the storms that have hit the republic since then. Indeed, they notoriously missed each major turn in the economy after 1973, as they had before.

Those in government service failed abysmally. During the dollar-selling panic of early 1978, European bankers were reported by the *Times* to be angrily describing the United States as "watching with a silly smile on its face." (The *Times* itself, of course, was foolishly clapping its hands.) Last September, the *Wall Street Journal* quoted "a senior policy official" in Washington as admitting, "Fundamentally, we've been wrong two years in a row."

Yet today, still, when a journalist seeks guidance on economic policy, he calls upon and cites the same club members who have proved so infallibly wrong in the past.

The same complaint has just been raised by an eminent liberal nonmember, Robert Lekachman, in the *Columbia Journalism Review* (March/April, 1979). He cited a typical analysis by Hobart Rowen in the *Washington Post*, which relied on a range of views from Arthur Okun on the "left" to William J. Fellner on the "right," and he noted "how little actually separates" the ideas of these experts.

But Lekachman's article itself scarcely went beyond our Tower of Pisa in its breadth. It urged journalists to pay more attention to the views of such dissenters as John Kenneth Galbraith. And what are these neglected views? That inflation is caused by the rigging of prices and wages by big business and big labor. And what is the cure? Compulsory control of prices and wages.

There isn't all that much difference between Galbraith's diagnosis and that of, say, Arthur Okun. Indeed, Galbraith has expressed sympathy for Okun's weird scheme for granting tax rebates to businesses and employees who do not increase prices and wages beyond set guidelines. It is a measure of the level of economic discourse today that this costly, unfair, unworkable, and inflationary plan should ac-

JOHN L. HESS is a nationally syndicated columnist and former reporter for the New York Times.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tually be supported by some liberals and proposed to Congress by a floundering administration.

But Galbraith holds that Okun does not go far enough. Mandatory controls are the ticket. Galbraith never tires of recalling the experience of World War II. His view is doubtless colored by nostalgia, for he was our first price administrator. He tends to overlook the fact that he was dismissed under the pressure of businessmen who found him too strict, and he tends to minimize the black market that developed. Especially, I think, he skips the fact that all phases of supply and production were under government regulation and rationing, to aid a popular war effort. Finally, he skips the fact that prices exploded once the war was won.

Let Galbraith and Lekachman be reassured: Compulsory controls will very likely be imposed when the "voluntary" guidelines are clearly shown to have failed. In similar if less urgent circumstances, after all, they were imposed by Nixon—who boldly proclaimed, "We are all Keynesians now." And in the end, as in Britain, controls will work chiefly to force labor to accept a still smaller share of the economic pie. But they will not stop inflation.

*BEFORE THEORIES OF POL*itical economy were replaced by computer jockeys wielding intimidating arrays of more or less phony statistics, the nature of inflation was widely understood: It is the expansion of money at a faster rate than that of the production of goods and services. Distribution of this wealth, or distributive justice, was seen as a separate question, although inflation did cause a transfer of wealth from the weak to the strong, the slow to the quick.

But when dollar inflation became a permanent feature of the world economy during and after World War II—permanent and enormously profitable—a new economic diagnosis became necessary. We began hearing of "cost-push" inflation, caused mainly by union labor. Even now, though labor has been losing buying power for years, union wages are the chief and most vulnerable target of "antiinflationary" policy and discourse. President Carter says he is "not particularly concerned" that profits rose 26 percent last year; as his advisers see it, high profits are needed for investment to increase productivity to increase profits further. High wages, however, are inflationary.

Our public discourse on inflation might be less befuddled if we measured it with a yardstick other than the Consumer Price Index, which is so constructed that a jump in the price of beef—or oil—can tilt us into "double digit" inflation. And then we can blame the cattlemen, or OPEC. Even the monetarist *Wall Street Journal* uses this clumsy device. Thus the forecasters in 1972 could consider inflation to be a European problem. It was *they*, not *us*, who were experiencing the double digits.

But the United States has been inflating the world money supply at a rapid rate since World War II. Our prices remained relatively stable because we exported the inflation. As long as other countries accepted dollars as a reserve currency and issued their own money in its place, we were getting their goods for IOUs. This was so splendid a deal for us that a theory was created to justify it. For many years, our financial writers were conjuring the threat of a liquidity shortage—not enough dollars—long after the first monetary panics appeared in the 1960s.

It was generally accepted that cheap and easy money was a stimulus to the economy. The computer jockeys developed formulas to express this: So much fiscal stimulation would reduce unemployment by so much. Even after it was discovered that we could have inflation and unemployment too, and the word stagflation had to be coined, this thinking persisted. Indeed, the government's chief effort to combat the 1977–78 run on the dollar was to pressure the sound-money countries to "stimulate" their economies more—in other words, to inflate their own currencies. (The *Times* was an enthusiastic advocate of this course.) It was moderately successful, for our trading partners, fearful of a general bust, were forced to go along.

The government's tactic to fight the 1977–78 run on the dollar was to urge sound-money countries to inflate their own currencies.

*DESPITE THE COMPUT*ers, nobody knows how many dollars are now at large in the world. Guesses range in the area of $600 billion to $800 billion, but the figures are fairly meaningless in the present state of the art. Some of the "Eurodollars" are now coming home to buy American property, thus adding to a stock of money in the domestic banking system now estimated at three-quarters of a trillion dollars. Against that, bank reserves are put at $37 billion, and lower reserve requirements have been proposed.

As this monetary volcano heats up, an alarmed public gropes for solutions. The right wing has made some headway in its drive to dismantle social programs and weaken unions. But contrary to what the conventional wisdom holds, a majority of the public has not embraced the rightist philosophy. People want the government to help the poor, to protect the environment, and to provide medical services at prices all can afford. Above all, however, they want inflation brought under control.

And all they hear about inflation slants to the right, like a Tower of Pisa. The liberals are frozen in the sterile debate of the 1930s, when "sound money" meant "let 'em starve" and deficit spending meant "prime the pump." The right, e.g., Bill Simon and Alan Greenspan, has learned to preach sound money while practicing inflation. Where are the sound-money liberals?

A sound-money liberal, if there is such an animal, would end the government deficit by tax reforms, by fighting waste and corruption, and especially by cutting the military budget. He would beef up antitrust action and the prosecution of price rigging. He would curtail the money-creating power of the Federal Reserve and the banks.

With such a program, we might have a real debate. Without it, we'll have more hot air, and inflation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Long billed as the salvation of the South, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project stands exposed as an illusion in search of a justification.

The Corps of Engineers in FANTASY LAND

By JOHNNY GREENE

The invention of radio-telegraphy, which coincided more or less with the completion of the [Rondon] *telegraph line around 1922, meant that the latter was completely superseded, and was no sooner finished than it became an archaeological relic of a previous technological age.*

—Claude Lévi-Strauss
Tristes Tropiques

ON THE MORNING OF MARCH 29, 1977, Governor Cliff Finch of Mississippi led a small, unruly invasion force through the normally drowsy streets of Columbus, Mississippi. Finch had hit town that morning and summoned his cadets to protest President Carter's threatened termination of the 253-mile-long Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project. Wearing hard hats as they marched to an open hearing convened to take testimony and assist Carter in determining the fate of the waterway, Finch and his army of irregulars chanted, "Tenn-Tom, not welfare."

It was an ironic chant they selected, one they sustained throughout a long, comical day in Columbus, and one they still cling to tenaciously in the face of rising national questioning of Tenn-Tom. In fact, their antithetical chant has become even more strident now that economists have identified the flatulent economic procedures used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, builders of the waterway, to justify the eventual $4 billion cost to U.S. taxpayers. Meanwhile, a coalition of U.S. senators intent on reducing the federal deficit has demanded cancellation of the canal, and long-withheld evidence has come to light, revealing that the waterway was already obsolete the morning Finch and his followers paraded through Columbus.

But that morning, few people outside the Corps of Engineers, entrenched Southern politicians hand-selected by the corps, and members of a taxpayer-funded promotional agency for the canal called the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Development Authority, knew of the corps's well-concealed misdeeds: the massive cost overruns, the day-to-day juggling of figures to produce an artificially favorable cost-benefit ratio for the waterway, or secret documents instructing corps officials to lie in congressional testimony and public statements concerning the costs of the canal.

So the characters in the Columbus comedy who brandished placards reading, "God, Motherhood, Apple Pie and Tenn-Tom," today appear more pathetic than prophetic. For years the corps and allied Southern politicians had promised Finch's army of hard hats and the other supporters of the canal that Tenn-Tom would deliver untold riches to their sixteen economically deprived counties in Mississippi and Alabama. If the waterway were cancelled, economic progress would stop dead still and their region would come to resemble the South in its wasteland years following the Civil War. And so it is no surprise, in retrospect, in light of a recent court-ordered disclosure of corps documents on the waterway, that politicians who were willingly choreographed by the corps in Columbus have since enjoyed eventful, if curious, midcareer passages.

■ Bill Burgin, a Mississippi state senator, jumped to his feet when the hearing opened that morning and demanded that no opponents of the waterway be allowed to speak. He reasoned with the moderator that he and 98 percent of the people of Mississippi and Alabama approved of the ditch, and the 2 percent who did not were therefore not entitled to their First Amendment rights. To the consternation of Finch's army, Burgin was overruled. Since the hearing, Burgin has been indicted and convicted of embezzlement, thrown out of the Mississippi Senate, and deserted by his Columbus, Mississippi, law partners.

■ Governor Finch ridiculed opposition to the canal that morning and emphasized the progress brought to the region by the waterway, pointing out twenty new fast-food outlets

JOHNNY GREENE *is a native Alabaman and a contributing editor to* Harper's.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the Columbus area alone. More than a year after the hearing, Finch's constituents apparently reconsidered his assessment of progress. In his bid to replace retiring Mississippi Senator James Eastland, Finch was overwhelmingly defeated, and the Mississippi Senate seat was won by a Republican for the first time since Reconstruction.

■ Governor Ray Blanton of Tennessee, long a political ally of the corps, joined Finch that morning in trashing opponents of the canal. Blanton was recently forced out of office by a clemency payoff scandal considered by many people in Tennessee to be the most disgraceful episode in their state's history since Braxton Bragg lost Lookout Mountain.

■ Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, another outspoken proponent of the canal, dispatched his very own representative to Columbus that morning. Stennis has yet to comment on published reports of his personal investment of over $60,000 in two prospective beneficiaries of the waterway: Mississippi Chemical Corporation and First Mississippi Corporation. According to the *Washington Post*, James Eastland also owns $100,000 worth of stock in Mississippi Chemical, whose founder, Owen Cooper of Yazoo City, is "a close personal friend of President Carter."

And so it was that after more than twenty years of deliberately misleading and deceiving the public, the Corps of Engineers and the Tenn-Tom Waterway Development Authority could briefly enjoy their success in laying those megaditch fantasies on the people. Their victory seemed assured when, only a week later, on April 5, 1977, Bert Lance left a Washington meeting with Finch, Blanton, and others who knew, but didn't care, that the waterway was obsolete, to phone the White House and have the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project removed from Carter's "hit list" of water projects and reinstated with full federal funding.

Anyone living on the Rondon Line might well believe he was on the moon. . . . Admittedly, there is the telegraph wire, but since it became useless as soon as it was set up, it sags between posts . . . having been either eaten away by termites or destroyed by Indians who mistake the characteristic hum of the telegraph wire for the buzzing of a hive of wild bees . . .

—Lévi-Strauss

THE 79TH CONGRESS, ON JULY 24, 1946, authorized the Corps of Engineers to dig a 170-foot-wide ditch linking the north-flowing Tennessee River to the south-flowing Tombigbee River. On paper, the plan looked simple enough. The small creeks comprising the headwaters of the Tombigbee rose in the hills of northeastern Mississippi, within a hundred miles of the Tennessee River. The planners promised that if a trench were cut through those 800-foot-high hills, the upper stretches of the Tombigbee widened, and the river declared navigable to Demopolis, Alabama, then the Tombigbee River would be a year-round navigable waterway from the Tennessee River to the seaport of Mobile, Alabama.

Nixon's approval of the Tenn-Tom canal was a brilliant move to win the support of Southern politicians for his policies.

But for more than twenty years following congressional authorization, the Corps of Engineers was unable to justify the construction of the ditch on economic grounds. In fact, the first Tennessee-Tombigbee survey, conducted by Powhatan Robinson, a corps district engineer, exposed the project for the fraud it was:

I must confess that the merits of this enterprise are utterly beyond my comprehension. I can see good sense in spending a small amount of money in improving the high water navigation of the Tombigbee, but this scheme presents nothing but incongruities in every aspect. . . . It has no national character and therefore must rest solely on its merits as an investment. No capitalist would accept it as a gift, on condition that he should keep it in repair.

In 1951 the House Appropriations Committee reached similar conclusions. After questions were raised concerning the width of the proposed ditch and the project's shaky economic justifications, a minor scandal ensued, project funds were revoked, and all further planning for Tenn-Tom was discontinued. Tenn-Tom remained in limbo for sixteen years, forgotten by the government but loyally defended by Deep South politicians who continued to demand its construction.

Probably no other waterway in the history of the nation has been proclaimed valid by the politicians of a region despite so many damaging analyses and unsuccessful economic rejustifications. Deep South political aspirants dangled the promise of Tenn-Tom before the public during every campaign. And over those years, the waterway took on an almost mythical aura in the public imagination. Increasingly, Southern senators, congressmen, and governors invoked the name of "Tenn-Tom" as if it held religious significance, as if it alone held all of the answers to the region's chronic economic stagnancy; as if it were somehow being held hostage or kept from them by mysterious, malicious forces, alien to the South. Their speeches suggested Tenn-Tom was a Southern providential right, its adherents on the side of the redress of economic evils, its detractors allied with the still hostile North. And in 1971, after years of metaphorical incantations had converted the populace, the politicians and the people of the Deep South at last received what they assumed to be their reward.

That year, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project was suddenly and unexpectedly resurrected from oblivion by Richard Nixon as a key part of his "Southern Strategy." Realizing the political inexpediency of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, Nixon consented to the revocation of that project and replaced it with Tenn-Tom. It was one of the most brilliant political maneuvers of Nixon's long career: He immediately brought into his fold, there to remain until the bitter end of his Presidency, an obedient cast of entrenched Southern senators, congressmen, and governors, each of whom would reap the enormous patronage benefits of the waterway and return to Nixon the benefits of his own seniority and bloc votes.

And to the people who lived in the path of the waterway, having been assured they were now to be delivered unto a Holy Land of Riches, one reference to the imminent coming

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Newspapers never questioned the tales of many jet boats and great big barge tows that would soon be floating to Mobile.

of Tenn-Tom was sufficient to silence any remaining local curiosity about the moonscape to be made of their region by the ditch. After all, when the waterway was undergoing an earlier, unsuccessful authorization study, the Tenn-Tom Waterway Development Authority had offered northeastern Mississippi as a sacrificial lamb, suggesting that area be vaporized by nuclear excavation in order to create a favorable cost-benefit ratio for construction of the waterway. Now, with Nixon's consent, the ditch was declared economically justifiable, and all that remained for the residents of the area was to wait for barges of gold to materialize on the horizon and float downstream from Tennessee.

While the residents waited, the corps went to work. The entire town of Holcutt, Mississippi, for example, was quickly purchased, evacuated, and totally destroyed. When asked about the disappearance of Holcutt, a corps official explained there was no time scheduled for sentiment. To blunt expected criticism, the Tenn-Tom Waterway Development Authority rapidly churned out press releases grossly inflating benefits to be realized from the ditch, distracting the populace with fantasy stories about jet boats racing effortlessly up and down the future waterway. These releases were reprinted, unedited and without question, by newspapers throughout Mississippi and Alabama. And if the local newspaper readers tired of tales about jet boats, the Waterway Development Authority was ready with even bolder fantasies. It released to the same newspaper, photographs of eighteen- and thirty-barge tows, claiming these tows would also glide along a waterway that, in truth, could nowhere accommodate a tow in excess of eight barges. These photographs, also reproduced by unquestioning newspaper editors, were then offered by local politicians as positive proof of the redemption they were bringing to the region through Tenn-Tom.

The unfortunate inhabitants—left behind by one of those waves of colonization . . . which sweep groups of adventurers or restless, poverty-stricken individuals on a great surge of enthusiasm into the interior and then immediately leave them stranded there, cut off from all contact with the civilized world—developed different forms of madness so as to adapt to their solitary existence...
—Lévi-Strauss

TENN-TOM MAY HAVE BEEN A PR MAN'S dream, but it has always been an economic nightmare. The problem encountered by the Corps of Engineers was basically simple. The Tombigbee River was entirely too narrow north of Demopolis, Alabama, to support any river traffic at all without being dredged out; and the river south of Demopolis could accommodate only small tows. The Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project, however, deals only with the river north of Demopolis. So when the corps planned to dig a ditch 300 feet wide north of Demopolis—thus defying legislation that had authorized a canal 170 feet wide—it suddenly became apparent that the narrower river south of Demopolis would never be capable of handling the heavy barge traffic that the corps projected to justify the project. If that traffic could not flow uninterruptedly from the Tennessee River to Mobile, Alabama, the corps might as well have asked Congress to let them build Tenn-Tom on the moon.

Furthermore, the corps realized that the soaring construction costs would exceed the benefits of their imaginary barge traffic. But the agency saw these costs as figures to manipulate in public. In testimony in the spring of 1974, the corps told Congress the cost of the waterway was $623 million, and in the summer of 1974 the corps indicated to the Office of Management and Budget and the staff of the House Appropriations Committee that the cost was $732 million. Privately, however, corps officials acknowledged that the cost had already passed the billion-dollar mark, and some of them began calling for yet another economic reanalysis to project a corresponding increase in waterway benefits.

Richard E. Smith, the area engineer having supervision of Tenn-Tom, addressed the public posture of the corps in a memo on the costs of the project. "I would recommend," he wrote, "we hold the Federal Cost under $1,000,000,000. Say $975,000,000. Considering the size of the estimate, $975 million is no less accurate than $1 billion and it has less emotional impact."

The internal corps estimate of the cost of Tenn-Tom at that date was $1159 million. So Smith's instructions were simple enough—lie to the public. Less than a month later, on January 6, 1975, a memo from A. G. Johnson, chief of the budget office for the South Atlantic division, confirmed this strategy. His memo states: ". . . since we were doing a new economic analysis, we should hold off [reporting] on the big cost increase until an integrated economic report is completed and submitted. . . . The estimate to be used is $815,000,000."

Although Johnson apparently felt a $315-million lie could be rationalized if new, fabricated benefits were soon forthcoming, a memo written three days later by the chief of the central budget section further explains the decision to withhold the real cost increases from Congress and the public, and pointedly implicates the corps in fixing arbitrary benefits.

"The underlying need for the study," the memo explains, "is to accurately determine the B/C [benefit/cost] ratio presented to Congress in support of further construction appropriations. . . . Pending completion of both benefit and cost studies, it does not appear prudent to raise one (costs) by nearly $400 million since last year's Appropriation hearings, while merely escalating benefits."

The reasons for the cost overruns, as well as the internal chaos created by the corps's unauthorized plans for a 300-foot-wide waterway, were revealed in a memo of September 22, 1975, by C. G. White, the head of planning in the South Atlantic division:

"It appears that no Congressional Act has authorized a change for the 170′ channel width in the 1946 report. . . . The 1966 study recommended use of an 8-barge tow in a 300′ waterway. This document [the 1966 study] is silent on the river below Demopolis. Now, *in 1975* we are told that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A secret report had proposed things like juggling the figures and writing off costs to show an impressive return to taxpayers.

another $60,000,000 is required to permit use of 8-barge tows below Demopolis.

"In 1975 we also are told that 3 bridges below Demopolis will become constraints and require replacement as traffic builds up. This is another $40,000,000.

"Several conclusions are inescapable; Mobile's report in 1966 did not address a $100,000,000 channel problem below Demopolis. . . . These costs . . . were buried and unidentified in the projected annual charges."

Having revealed the corps's manner of hiding as much as $100 million from Congress and the public, White further admitted, "Cutoffs, widening and bridge replacement below Demopolis have no authorization." Obviously, his memo does not explain why unauthorized plans for the waterway were earmarked for "buried and unidentified" funds. But he did go on to rally his troops to immediate and urgent action: ". . . we have one chance to salvage this project. Our time is now and will last for about 60 days. We must take our best shot right now. I am convinced this has not been done. I was keenly aware of this last week when I belatedly perceived that the only benefit estimate being prepared was for a plan that exceeds our authorization."

But while White was making his extraordinary admissions and calling for action, a secret report on the authorization of Tenn-Tom was being prepared by the head of planning for the project in the central office. As curious and criminal as the deception surrounding the cost overruns might have been, this secret report added a new dimension to the situation. One corps insider recently described it as "crazy." And a few selected passages from the report do not prove otherwise.

"The project as authorized provides for a channel with a minimum width of 170 feet . . . and 18 locks to connect the Tennessee and Tombigbee rivers. A supplement to GDM No. 1 [General Design Memorandum Number One], submitted in 1966, recommended that the project be modified to increase the channel width to 300 feet and that the number of locks be reduced to 10. The same supplement also recognized . . . additional locks to be provided at Demopolis and Coffeeville on the Warrior-Tombigbee Waterway. . . . General Counsel indicates they consider the authorization of the 300-foot channel to be 'cloudy.' Since the duplicate locks were not mentioned in the Secretary's approval of the 300-foot channel, their authorization is even more doubtful."

The report then lists various alternatives available to the corps. Of the five alternatives, three suggest the corps proceed to build the waterway. But each of the three contains the phrase "assume authority exists," or "assuming the width is authorized." Later in the report, apparently from out of the blue, an "Alternative No. 6" is adopted: "Continue construction of the project assuming the Secretary of the Army did not exceed his discretionary authority when he approved the increase in width to 300 feet and seek authorization for the cut-offs below Demopolis and the duplicate locks at Coffeeville and Demopolis. . . . This plan is . . . the plan currently being designed and constructed."

Incredibly, having already recommended that the corps proceed on assumptions, divesting taxpayer funds on hunches of future authorizations, the report then concludes with an even more chilling recommendation: "The problem of continuing construction on a plan without economic justification . . . might be overcome to an extent by considering the funds expended to date as sunk costs. In this regard an estimated $118,000,000 ($110,000,000 Federal) having been expended to date on project construction, treating this as a sunk cost the resulting BCR [Benefit/Cost Ratio] would be 1.02." Thus, by juggling the figures and writing off the costs, the corps was able to show an impressive $1.02 return for every federal dollar spent on Tenn-Tom.

Few outside the bureaucracy were privy to this information, which if revealed would have been disastrous to the corps. In retrospect it is not idle to ask how the corps got away with so many blatant irregularities and indiscretions. But governmental agencies that "assume" their self-perpetuation at taxpayer expense eventually insinuate themselves into so many different layers of the government that their tentacles corrupt everything they touch. And so it was that an audit of the corps and Tenn-Tom, delivered in 1976 to the assistant secretary of the army for civil works and prepared by the Army Audit Agency, was treated as if it were a classified document.

Had that audit been released to the public, the following would then have been known:

- The estimated cost of the project increased by more than $1071 million (470 percent) from fiscal year 1967 through fiscal year 1976.
- The procedures used by the corps in preparing cost estimates during the early stages of large civil works projects do not provide for the reporting of realistic costs. The fiscal year 1967 estimate of $229 million for Tenn-Tom was based on a conceptual design unsupported by survey or engineering work.
- According to available records, known cost increases totalling $344 million were not reported in the fiscal year 1975. The records made available to the Army Audit Agency by the corps showed the costs were not reported in order to protect the project's shaky cost-benefit ratio.
- Other than items already under contract ($160 million), the validity of cost estimates for the waterway generally could not be verified. Unit prices, lump sum costs, and quantity figures contained in detailed cost estimates were either not referred to source documents or the reasons for using the costs and quantities were not made a part of the official records. The Army Audit Agency was informed it was not the corps's policy to maintain such detailed documentation.
- Although not presently authorized or included in cost estimates, additional locks will be required at Demopolis and Coffeeville, Alabama; and certain sections of the Tombigbee River will have to be widened between Demopolis and Mobile, Alabama. This additional work could increase

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the federal cost of the waterway by at least $214 million.

■ Projected nonfederal participation in funding the waterway may not materialize, and the participation by the states of Mississippi and Alabama could fall short by as much as $170 million.

But further disappointments would have to be endured before I realized that the sense of time did not exist in the world I was now entering. . . . I was once stuck for a whole week, because one of our mules, or so I was assured, had set off into the campo, first walking sideways, then backwards, to make sure that its rastos (tracks) could not be followed by its pursuers.

—Lévi-Strauss

TO MAKE THE TENNESSEE-TOMBIGBEE Waterway Project irresistible to the Congress, despite uncontrollable costs, the Corps of Engineers commissioned various benefit studies. The principal economic benefit claimed for Tenn-Tom's first year of operation is for navigation—$86,587,335 out of a total assumed benefit package of $99,412,335.

The corps based its analysis of benefits on 121 projected navigation movements. It concluded that in 1986, the first year of the waterway's operation, 28 million tons of commerce would move along the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway; of this approximately 70 percent would be strip-mined coal either for export or use in the Southeastern states. One estimate includes coal mined in southern Tennessee. But a recent article in *Coal Week* stated that if coal left that area at the rate predicted by the corps, "all of southern Tennessee's current recoverable reserves would be depleted in 15 years or around the year 2000—well before the end of the 50-year economic life of the canal."

Equally disquieting, the *Washington Post* has already reported that one major shipper, Kentucky Energy Development Company, which the corps claimed would be using the waterway, is out of business and had never produced anywhere near the amount of coal shipments the corps indicated would be forthcoming.

The Alabama Power Company's Greene County plant at Demopolis was to have received over $20 million in coal shipments out of the $86 million in benefits claimed by the corps. That coal was to have come from either Shawneetown, Illinois, or Harriman, Tennessee. But the Greene County plant buys coal under long-term contract with mines on the Warrior River north of Demopolis, and the amount of coal that the corps predicted would move to the Greene County plant is more than the plant can burn.

A movement of export coal from Graysville, Tennessee, to Mobile was said to represent $10 million of the $86 million in benefits. But documents reveal the movement was not in existence when the corps commissioned the study of benefits, and in 1978 the corps learned the shipper was out of business. Even so, the benefits claimed for that company remain in the corps' projected benefits.

At least $60 million of a total $86 million in waterway benefits claimed by the corps was wholly invented and nonexistent.

These horror stories are representative. Overall, no less than $60 million of the $86 million the corps claimed in benefits was invented and nonexistent.

No sooner had he arrived than the Hungarian—who had apparently entered the priesthood to do penance for a wild and stormy youth—had an attack of the kind French colonists call le coup de bambou (tropical madness). Through the walls of the mission, he could be heard insulting his superior who . . . exorcized him with a great many signs of the cross and cries of "Vade retro, Satanas!" When the devil had been finally cast out, the Hungarian was put on bread and water for a fortnight—symbolically, at least, since there was no bread at Juruena.

—Lévi-Strauss

The Corps of Engineers, now apparently realizing that its fantasy is threatened, is rushing to dig its ditch faster than ever. For the first time, the corps understands it is faced with the strongest national challenge it has yet to encounter, and from the one sector it could not buy off—the taxpayers. The loyal, docile supporters of the corps in Congress and the federal courts have held the line against all incursions. But even those ranks are thinning. Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, up in arms over the corps's "deliberate deception" of Congress, has begun mobilizing opposition to what he calls "the biggest pork-barrel boondoggle of them all."

The corps is not an organization that gives up without a fight. It has invested too many years and too many taxpayer dollars in self-perpetuation. All along the Tombigbee, the corps is proceeding with its unauthorized plans for the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. Dredge barges hit the river banks daily, construction crews assemble at sites with their earthmovers, and by staying ahead of its Tenn-Tom critics, the corps intends to present a *fait accompli* of federal dollars spent and wasted as an excuse to build the obsolete waterway.

A federal court challenge to Tenn-Tom was recently dismissed, on grounds similar to the corps's *fait accompli* defense, by a Mississippi federal judge who had been appointed, nominated, and confirmed under the patronage of Senator John Stennis, one of the waterway's most powerful supporters. And it is feared that unless there is broad national support, a bill scheduled for introduction by Senator Nelson might suffer the same fate. Nelson's bill would sink the corps' dredges once and for all.

There are many viable alternatives to constructing the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project. The most obvious is to stop the project now, restore as much of the Tombigbee River as can still be salvaged, and thereby save the taxpayers $4 billion. But that will not be easy; the corps is as defiant as its supporters in Congress and the compliant politicians it manipulated that long-ago day in Columbus when the corps turned a public hearing into an extravaganza worthy of Disney Enterprises.

Indeed, if the abolition of the corps should prove politically impossible, then the U.S. government ought to proceed at once to donate the Army Corps of Engineers to Walt Disney Enterprises. There in the Fantasy Land of Disney World, cut off from their purchases of politicians, the destruction of homes and rivers and streams, the corps could take out its myriad designs for the old, obsolete Tenn-Tom, and with eyes cast resolutely on the heavens, wish with harmless abandon on any star. ❧

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KENNEDY ASSASSINATION COVER-UP

By PETER DALE SCOTT



November 25, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MOYERS

It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy's Assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States and abroad that all the facts have been told and that a statement to this effect be made now.

1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial.

2. Speculation about Oswald's motivation ought to be cut off, and we should have some basis for rebutting thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain press is saying) a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists. Unfortunately the facts on Oswald seem about too pat--too obvious (Marxist, Cuba, Russian wife, etc.). The Dallas police have put out statements on the Communist conspiracy theory, and it was they who were in charge when he was shot and thus silenced.

3. The matter has been handled thus far with neither dignity nor conviction. Facts have been mixed with rumour and speculation. We can scarcely let the world see us totally in the image of the Dallas police when our President is murdered.

I think this objective may be satisfied by making public as soon as possible a complete and thorough FBI report on Oswald and the assassination. This may run into the difficulty of pointing to inconsistencies between this report and statements by Dallas police officials. But the reputation of the Bureau is such that it may do the whole job.

The only other step would be the appointment of a Presidential Commission of unimpeachable personnel to review and examine the evidence and announce its conclusions. This has both advantages and disadvantages. It think it can await publication of the FBI report and public reaction to it here and abroad.

I think, however, that a statement that all the facts will be made public property in an orderly and responsible way should be made now. We need something to head off public speculation or Congressional hearings of the wrong sort.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Deputy Attorney General

The House Assassinations Committee has shown that at least two gunmen fired at President Kennedy in Dallas. Why then did the FBI and CIA push so vigorously for the lone-nut theory?

ONE WEEK AFTER THE announcement by the House Select Committee on Assassinations that at least two gunmen had shot at President Kennedy in Dealey Plaza, the nation's leading establishment newspa-

PETER DALE SCOTT teaches English at the University of California, Berkeley. He is author of Crime and Coverup *and co-editor of* The Assassinations: Dallas and Beyond.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pers were urging their readers to think nothing of it. Both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* editorially rebuked the House committee for having used the suggestive word "conspiracy," although the *Times* was prepared to concede that the word "is technically correct." The *Times* would have us talk of "two maniacs instead of one"; the *Post* referred to "societal outcasts" developing "in some spontaneous way a common determination to express their alienation." In short, nothing to worry about. The *Post* explicitly advised the Justice Department that there was "little reason" to explore the committee's "dead ends" and "cold trails."

Though scientific evidence indicating a second gunman, on the grassy knoll, will hardly help to identify the assassins, it does help to illuminate the governmental cover-up of eyewitness testimony that from the outset had spoken of a shot or shots from that area. The Warren Commission report itself, in an appendix, "The Source of the Shots," asserted that "There is no evidence that any shots were fired at the President from anywhere other than the Texas School Book Depository." To discredit the idea of an alternative source, the appendix brazenly cited the testimony of "13 railroad employees who were on the overpass" in front of the motorcade, even though at least six of them had testified unequivocally that they had heard shots and/or seen a puff of smoke from the clump of trees along the picket fence on the grassy knoll. Frank Reilly had told the commission, "It seemed to me like they [the shots] come out of the trees." His companion Sam Holland agreed, "I definitely saw the puff of smoke and heard the report from under those trees."

This is only one very small, and no doubt relatively innocent, example of the continuing governmental cover-up that since 1963 has systematically distorted the realities of the Kennedy case and thus obstructed its solution. The existence of a cover-up does not prove that the U.S. government itself was somehow involved in the crime—only that the crime was plotted in such a way that to unravel it would threaten major governmental interests, thus inducing a cover-up. The stakes might have been world peace, if a foreign power was, or falsely appeared to be, implicated; or a sensitive government operation, with which Oswald may well have been connected, whether or not he was involved in the actual killing.

Neither of these examples is hypothetical. Within hours of the assassination, officials in Dallas and elsewhere were suggesting, on the flimsiest of evidence, that Oswald was part of a Communist conspiracy, acting on orders out of Havana or Moscow. Worse yet, highly dubious reports, already in U.S. intelligence files, provided some backing for these false conspiracy stories—which soon began to circulate about Jack Ruby as well. Thus, in the context of rumors that were as dangerous as they were misleading, reasonable men may well have settled on a "lone assassin" hypothesis for pragmatic reasons, as less misleading and less dangerous than the alternative theories already circulating. One need not, therefore, assume malevolent motives on the part of all those who engaged in the cover-up, both within the government and among such nongovernmental pillars of the community as the *New York Times*.

It is obvious, however, that "two maniacs instead of one" could not by themselves have engineered the pressures for concealment. Indeed, planning the assassination so as to provoke a cover-up called for far more sophistication than did the simple murder of the President. In particular, it called for close knowledge of how the U.S. government could be expected to react.

For years, some critics have argued that, just as with Watergate, so too in this case the solution to the crime lies in exposing the cover-up. They appealed to the House committee to focus on key evidence of, and witnesses to, significant attempts at concealment—such as the autopsy doctor's failure to fully probe the wound-track in the President's neck, because, as he later testified under oath, "I was told not to." The committee, however, did not go this route. On the contrary, it concluded that the investigation of Oswald's responsibility for the assassination was "thorough and reliable," though there were inadequacies in the investigation of a possible conspiracy, and numerous suggestive clues pointed toward a conspiratorial cover-up.

For example, agents of army intelligence might have been considered prime suspects, since they had falsely identified "Harvey Lee Oswald" as a card-carrying Communist and defector to Cuba, in a cable of November 22, 1963, from the 112th Intelligence Group in Texas to the U.S. Strike Command in Florida which was then on a "red alert" for possible military action against Cuba. That provocative cable only reached the Warren Commission indirectly, from another agency; the army itself failed to supply the commission with intelligence files it had maintained on Oswald since 1959. The Defense Department has since also destroyed all its files on the assassination, according to Jack Anderson, despite a warning from the Justice Department not to do so.

But army intelligence was by no means the only federal agency to withhold information from the Warren Commission. For example, the CIA never gave the Warren Commission all the evidence it had accumulated concerning the claim, circulated to other agencies shortly before the assassination, that "a man who identified himself as Lee Oswald" had spoken in Mexico City with Soviet consul Valery Vladimirovich Kostikov. This report on Oswald, even if ultimately proven false, might have been enough in itself to trigger a benign cover-up in the name of peace. Kostikov, known to be a KGB agent, was in 1963 the object of special FBI attention as a member of the KGB's Department Thirteen—the section specializing in "wet affairs," i.e., sabotage and murder.

Some critics have argued that the solution to the assassination lies in exposing the cover-up.

Right after the assassination, Russian émigré groups with U.S. intelligence contacts claimed, apparently without evidence, that Oswald had attended a KGB Department Thirteen assassination school in Moscow or Minsk.

The potentially explosive story of an Oswald-Kostikov contact seems to have been handled cautiously by CIA headquarters. Their teletype of October 10, 1963, was careful to speak of a "man who identified himself as Lee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oswald," who had *said* (to a Soviet embassy guard) that he had spoken with Kostikov three days earlier. This account clearly leaves room for the possibility that an impostor, not Oswald, was planting a false trail to the KGB. But a member of the CIA's Mexico City station turned this allegation into purported fact when he reported on October 16 that "this officer [i.e., himself] *determined* that Oswald . . . had talked with . . . Kostikov." In other words, the officer reported the alleged Oswald's claim as fact; and if the alleged Oswald's claim was false, so was the agent's.

The FBI campaigned through the media to win support for its hasty findings that Oswald acted alone.

Most critics now think the alleged Oswald was an impostor. The CIA, right after the assassination, sent to Dallas photos it claimed were of this man; clearly they are shots of someone heavyset, balding, and middle-aged. The world knows of these photos because Marguerite Oswald, who was shown one of them the night before her son Lee was killed, later thought, mistakenly, that it was a photo of Jack Ruby. It took weeks for the Warren Commission just to establish that this photo was taken in Mexico City. The commission apparently never saw an FBI report about a CIA recording of the alleged Lee Oswald's voice; the report said that the recording reached the Dallas FBI along with the photographs, and was rejected by them as not being of Oswald. The recording itself, an important possible clue to a conspiracy, apparently disappeared some time after the assassination, and a solitary documentary reference to it did not reach any audience outside intelligence circles until 1975. Retired CIA officer David Phillips recently claimed that the recordings of "Oswald" in Mexico were destroyed *prior* to the assassination—a claim challenged by the FBI document.

One thus gets the impression that the CIA, possibly quite innocently, had both photographs and a voice recording of a conspirator, not Oswald, who was consciously inducing the future cover-up of the assassination of the President by laying a false trail to the doorstep of the KGB's assassination bureau in Mexico City. Such a conspirator would of course be no "maniac" or "societal outcast," but a sophisticated planner who was counting on the CIA's surveillance of the Soviet embassy in Mexico City to detect his contact with Kostikov. In 1963 such a person would almost certainly have had to be associated with the global intelligence milieu, an insider privy to special knowledge about the CIA's procedures.

Richard Helms, then the CIA's deputy director for plans, took steps to dispel this impression, so far as the photograph was concerned. In a belated explanation to the Warren Commission, which was itself withheld from the public until 1967, Helms assured the commission that the photograph was taken on October 4, 1963—two days after Oswald was supposed to have left Mexico City. He gave the alternative impression that Oswald and the unidentified middle-aged man had only been confused ex post facto in some innocent CIA mix-up. Such an explanation could work for the photograph, since photos do not identify themselves. If the FBI report is correct, however, the recording could not have been sent by mistake; it recorded the voice of someone, apparently not Oswald, who "identified himself as Lee Oswald."

IF IT CONCEALED THE recording, however, the CIA was not acting like a "rogue elephant," since it had help from the other agencies that shared its information, in particular the FBI. Following an official rebuke by a Senate subcommittee for ignoring "significant leads," the FBI files on Oswald and the Kennedy assassination have recently been declassified, after security deletions, and made public. These files show the FBI's role in covering up to have been much more deliberate than was suggested by the report of Senators Richard Schweiker and Gary Hart, which spoke merely of "deficiencies," and of "efforts focused too narrowly to allow for a full investigation." The FBI did not simply fail to interview certain important witnesses to a possible conspiracy; more than once it sent urgent orders that such witnesses were not to be interviewed. And it campaigned vigorously through the media to win support for its hasty finding that Oswald was the lone assassin.

The same files show J. Edgar Hoover ordering the release of information to "very friendly" journalists like Jeremiah O'Leary, now of the *Washington Star*, who in December 1978 was the first journalist to propose the hypothesis of two lone nuts in Dealey Plaza firing within the same half-second. These files also show "corrective" interviews with the employers and backers of journalists who had published stories deemed unfriendly: From these memos we learn how sensitive was the subject of Oswald's preassassination contacts with the FBI—a subject unclear to this day. For example, when Drew Pearson reported that the FBI had interviewed Oswald six days before the assassination, yet failed to warn the Secret Service about him, the FBI tried to silence the columnist. FBI Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach interviewed one of the chief stockholders of Pearson's distribution syndicate, "furnished him sufficient ammunition to refute all of Pearson's facts," and arranged for the apparently sympathetic stockholder to report back in person on his rebuke of Pearson. The idea of a contact between Oswald and the FBI on November 16 faded until 1975, when the FBI first revealed that at some point in November 1963 ("approximately one week or ten days prior to November 22," according to the Schweiker-Hart report), Oswald did visit the Dallas FBI office and leave a threatening note.

The FBI even resorted to "dirty tricks" to suppress dissent over its conclusions. In February 1964, when Mark Lane was planning to present the case for a grassy-knoll assassin before a public meeting at Town Hall in New York, the FBI tried unsuccessfully to prevent the meeting from taking place. At one stage, using what its files call "counterintelligence action," the FBI succeeded in having Town Hall (a private auditorium) cancel the meeting; when Lane's contract was later upheld in court the FBI took comfort from the fact that Lane had been required to put up a costly $25,000 performance bond. In 1966 the FBI prepared memos linking Lane and other prominent assassination critics to allegedly subversive activities; these were supplied on request to Marvin Watson,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

President Johnson's political troubleshooter. (This request from the White House seems particularly cynical in the light of subsequent revelations that Johnson himself shared the belief that the assassination in Dallas had been part of a conspiracy.)

IN *THESE FILES HOOVER* does not appear as the inducer of cover-up through false allegations of international conspiracy, but rather as the one so induced, attempting by the lone-assassin hypothesis to put such allegations to rest. White House files, as reported by the Schweiker-Hart committee, confirm this impression. On November 24, 1963, in a phone conversation with White House aide Walter Jenkins, Hoover stated, "The thing I am most concerned about, and so is [Deputy Attorney General] Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin."

The next day Katzenbach himself wrote to another Presidential assistant, Bill Moyers, suggesting that an FBI report on Oswald and the assassination be released as soon as possible, to convince the public that "Oswald was the assassin," and that "he did not have confederates who are still at large." Such a report would provide "some basis for rebutting thoughts that this was a Communist conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain press is saying) a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists." One learns from this memo how readily liberals like Katzenbach, appalled by the rhetoric coming out of Dallas, authorized a lone-assassin story. The FBI did quickly prepare just such a report and leak its lone-assassin finding to the press, before the Warren Commission had even settled down to its first meeting.

Another memo from FBI Assistant Director Courtney Evans shows how zealously Katzenbach shared the FBI's desire to reinforce the lone-assassin hypothesis: "One of the dangers [*sic*] which Katzenbach sees is the possibility that the state hearing to be held in Texas may develop some pertinent information not now known. In an effort to minimize this, he is having Assistant Attorney General Miller confer with the state officials in Texas in an effort to have them restrict their hearing to the proposition of showing merely that Oswald killed the President. . . ."

For its part, the FBI tried to ensure that the Warren Commission would reach the same conclusion. Hoover even intervened at the *Washington Post* to block a proposed editorial calling for the establishment of such a Presidential commission; he claimed that, given the FBI's "intensive investigation," a further review would "muddy waters."

Later, when commission member Allen Dulles warned his old CIA colleague James Angleton that the Warren Commission was considering hiring its own investigative staff, Angleton passed the warning along to the FBI. FBI Deputy Associate Director Alan H. Belmont noted that the commission "should be discouraged from having an investigative staff" and as a first step moved to limit the number of copies of the first secret FBI report made available to the commission.

Thus it was by no accident, but Justice Department policy, that the Warren Commission found itself dependent for facts on the FBI, which had already (as commission counsel J. Lee Rankin complained in January 1964) "decided that it is Oswald who committed the assassination" and that "no one else was involved."

This dependence made it virtually impossible for the commission to check out independently published allegations—backed by a hearsay report that the name and phone number of FBI agent James Hosty were in Oswald's address book—that Oswald was an FBI informant. The FBI, when it learned of the commission's interest in Oswald's preassassination FBI contacts, did belatedly confirm this report. Earlier, however, the FBI had provided a typewritten transcription of Oswald's address book in which the Hosty entry was omitted: The relevant page of this transcript was actually retyped, and its contents then failed to fill the page by just the number of lines of the missing Hosty entry.

The recently released FBI documents show other instances in which key information was either altered before it reached the Warren Commission, or else withheld altogether. For example, judging from Warren Commission records, the FBI seems to have covered up Jack Ruby's connections to organized crime. The commission did not receive an important interview with Luis Kutner, a Chicago lawyer who had just told the press (correctly) about Ruby's connections to Chicago mobsters Lennie Patrick and Dave Yaras. All the FBI transmitted was a meaningless follow-up interview in which Kutner merely said he had no additional information.

Apparently the FBI also failed to transmit a teletype revealing that Yaras, a national hit man for the Chicago syndicate who had grown up with Ruby, and who had been telephoned by one of Ruby's Teamster contacts on the eve of the assassination, was about to attend a "hoodlum meeting" of top East and West Coast syndicate representatives, including some from the "family" of the former Havana crime lord Santos Trafficante.

It is therefore significant that the FBI also suppressed a report that a British free-lance newsman, John Wilson-Hudson, claimed to have been in a Havana prison in 1959 with "an American gangster named Santos" (presumably Trafficante), when "Santos" was visited by someone called Ruby whom the newsman believed was Jack Ruby. Wilson-Hudson had offered to look at photographs of Jack Ruby to see if he was indeed that visitor, but FBI headquarters, in an urgent cable to London, vetoed the suggestion: "Prior information available at Bureau that Ruby in Havana, Cuba, in 1959. Bureau desires no further investigation re Wilson." In this way the Warren Commission never heard either about the alleged Ruby-"Santos" contact. Nor did it see allegations in the FBI files that linked Ruby at that time to Trafficante's Miami associate Dave Yaras "through shylocking and girls."

FBI files show instances in which important information was withheld from the commission.

Such blatant interference by FBI headquarters in the investigative process is recorded in the files only rarely. But this only confirms that the bureau's professed lack of interest in a lead to "Santos" probably derived not from ignorance but from knowledge—perhaps knowledge of the CIA's use of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trafficante and Chicago crime boss Sam Giancana in plots to assassinate Fidel Castro, since CIA embarrassment about this relationship had already led the Justice Department to drop criminal charges in another case involving Giancana. That would be a relatively nonconspiratorial explanation for the bureau's intervention—an example of "induced cover-up" through appeals to "national security."

The FBI and Secret Service concealed the fact that they had warning of plans to kill JFK.

SUCH AN EXPLANATION is less plausible for the FBI's interference with leads that appeared to be guiding its agents to the actual assassins of the President—a case, seemingly, of obstruction of justice, or worse. How else should one assess the response of FBI headquarters to a report from Miami that Joseph Adams Milteer, a white racist with Klan connections, had in early November 1963 correctly warned that a plot to kill the President "from an office building with a high-powered rifle" was already "in the working"? These words are taken from an actual tape-recording of a discussion between Milteer and his friend, Miami police informant Bill Somersett. Miami police provided copies of this tape to both the Secret Service and the FBI on November 10, 1963, two weeks before the assassination. Four days after the assassination Somersett reported that Milteer had been "jubilant" about it: " 'Everything ran true to form. I guess you thought I was kidding you when I said he would be killed from a window with a high-powered rifle.' " In both of the relevant FBI reports, Somersett was described as "a source who had furnished reliable information in the past."

What was the response of FBI headquarters to the second report? An order was sent to Miami to "amend the reliability statement to show that some of the information furnished by [Somersett] is such that it could not be verified or corroborated." The headquarters file copy noted that "investigation by Atlanta has indicated there is no truth in the statements by [Somersett] and that Milteer was in Quitman, Georgia, during perti[n]ent period." This notation referred to an interview by the Atlanta FBI with Milteer himself, who quite understandably denied ever having threatened Kennedy, or even having "heard anyone make such threats." This simple denial was forwarded to the Warren Commission in December 1963; but the reports from Somersett (duly rewritten to make them less credible) were not forwarded until August 7, 1964, when the commission had almost completed its work. Nothing was ever said to the commission about the tape in the FBI's possession that proved conclusively that Somersett had reported his conversation truthfully, and that Milteer, in his denial, was lying. Nor did the commission hear about this tape from the Secret Service.

In their cover-up of the Milteer tape, the FBI and the Secret Service concealed the fact that they had both had prior warning of "plans . . . to kill President John F. Kennedy." But Milteer had not merely predicted, correctly, the *modus operandi* of the assassination, he had also predicted the cover-up:

> Somersett: Boy, if that Kennedy gets shot, we have got to know where we are at. Because you know that will be a real shake, if they do that.
>
> Milteer: They wouldn't leave any stone unturned there no way. They will pick up somebody within hours afterwards, if anything like that would happen, just to throw the public off.

Since 1963 both Milteer, the extremist, and Somersett, the informant, have died. Their deaths might seem to corroborate the *Washington Post*'s opinion that it is now too late to pursue the "cold trails" of the John F. Kennedy assassination. But the important new leads here pertain not so much to the crime as to the cover-up, not so much to events in Miami or in Dallas as those inside the FBI and other government agencies. For example, following the analogy of Watergate, one candidate it might be useful to interrogate is Robert P. Gemberling, a retired special agent under whose supervision the page with the missing Hosty entry was retyped, and through whose hands the important Somersett interviews reached the Warren Commission nine months late. It is not likely that Gemberling, an apparently modest and mild-mannered man, has important knowledge bearing directly on the assassination; but, like the Kroghs and Deans of Watergate, he could perhaps lead interviewers to those involved at a higher level in conspiratorial cover-up.

Until recently the problem has not been finding candidates for interview; it was to find someone who could be relied on to interview them. Not the FBI, obviously, nor the Justice Department, whose deputy attorney general pressed so vigorously for the lone-assassin story in 1963. Not the national media such as the *New York Times*, in whose headlines Oswald had been convicted before he had been either executed or tried.

It is, in the end, some kind of tribute to the battered institutions of this nation that, despite such a coalition of indifference, the cover-up has not succeeded. On the contrary, thanks both to the already published findings of the House Select Committee and to the prior effort of citizens who disputed the official scenario, the dimensions of the cover-up have become clearer than ever before. Now, for the first time, the critics, rather than the advocates of the lone-assassin theory, have behind them the weight of scientific evidence and a considered governmental judgment.

Shall we now at last see some credible answers to the questions raised by a President's murder? This will depend in part on how honestly the House committee report, soon to be published, accepts the reality, not only of the conspiracy, but also of a cover-up.

The generation with deep psychological and institutional commitments to the lone-assassin fiction is beginning to pass from the scene. After Vietnam, Watergate, and the congressional hearings on federal intelligence agencies, most Americans now are more skeptical about official lies—and new revelations about the assassination have only reinforced that skepticism. Even at the *Washington Post* the picture may be changing. One month after the editorial page, controlled by former CIA officer Philip Geyelin, endorsed the "multiple lone nut" theory, the Outlook section published an intelligent article in support of conspiracy by two members of the Assassination Information Bureau. Is it too much to hope that, at long last, the rest of the nation's press will follow suit? ❑

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHRISTOPHER ISHERWOOD: A Critical Biography, by Brian Finney. Oxford University Press, 364 pp., $12.95.

A single man

PETER STANSKY

TOGETHER WITH WILLIAM Abrahams, I am presently engaged in writing a second volume of a study of George Orwell, covering his life and work during the 1930s. We are finding it a difficult book to do, in part because of the intensely autobiographical nature of Orwell's own writings, in which as a creative artist he transposes his own experiences into art. In his case, the situation is given an extra twist by the fact that Orwell is a pseudonym: His real name was Eric Blair. But Orwell became something more than a nom de plume; from about the time of the Spanish Civil War until his death in 1950, he was known to those he met as George Orwell. Yet when Anthony Powell suggested to him that he change his legal name to George Orwell, he replied that he might do that, but then he would have to find another name to write with. The nature of the creative process is endlessly fascinating, and particularly intriguing and complex with an autobiographical writer of fiction: fiction that some take as fact, and fact that an author deems it legitimate to treat as a form of fiction in order to get to the "true facts" of the author's self.

Christopher Isherwood presents a very similar situation: He has perpetually rung the changes on who he is, in a seemingly more straightforward but in fact more complex way than George Orwell ever did. After two rather traditional novels—*All The Conspirators* (1928) and *The Memorial* (1932)—Isherwood's career moved into its first major phase in 1935 with the Berlin stories; here the narrator takes the name of the author, as in his stylized autobiography, *Lions and Shadows* (1938).

That is just the beginning. To try to sort out the various personalities—the multiple Isherwoods—and to assess their contributions to art, is a difficult task; there have been two recent attempts to do so by the route of biography. Last year, Jonathan Fryer published a life of Isherwood that provided facts but little more. Now Brian Finney has written a far better but still not ideal book on Isherwood, but is the ideal book even possible? Finney's is an intelligent, sensitive study, providing the story of Isherwood's life as well as thoughtful literary criticism. Anyone interested in Isherwood will find it highly useful. Separate chapters on the books are a sensible way to proceed, although that makes it even more difficult to integrate the life and works. Some sort of unity is achieved, ultimately, and a sense emerges of the underlying artistic purpose in both Isherwood's fiction and nonfiction: the search for the essence of personality, no matter what the accidents of events may be.

Finney has been assiduous in tracking down whatever and whomever he could, talking with Isherwood and his friends and acquaintances and reading correspondence and the critical literature as well as the more than sixty published interviews that have appeared over the years. He attempts to illuminate the creative process itself, and also to act as a guide to both the life and the work. It is a formidable task, not only to discriminate among the layers of possible personalities that Isherwood has provided himself in his writings, but to maintain the requisite sense of distance from a writer who is, thankfully, still writing. Finney has not quite found his own voice about Isherwood. The critical sections tend from time to time to be too much an anthology of other writers' views, as we are told what various critics, reviewers, and friends have remarked about the book in question.

Nevertheless this study is rather artful, and gradually builds a picture of Isherwood, what he seems to be up to in his literary life, and its deep but not absolute connection with his own personal life. Finney has the virtue of



BRUCE MCGILVRAY

PETER STANSKY teaches British history at Stanford University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

taking Isherwood seriously—his status as a major writer is quite rightly simply assumed—and yet being able to observe him with a certain amount of detachment, pointing out both the continuities of his work, and the changes over the years. Isherwood was able to take the not uncommon themes of childhood—a secret country, in his case Mortmere; a sense of enemies, the Others, who have to be fought; the tension between the weak and the strong; and, most frequently, the need to be truly brave, the Test—and make them into literature.

These themes were given special depth by the circumstances of the time. The securities of early twentieth-century Britain were destroyed by the First World War, more intensely so for Isherwood because of the death of his father in that war. He felt the political uncertainties of the between-the-wars period and saw them at their most violent in Berlin just before Hitler came to power. This coincidence gave his Berlin stories more resonance of a political kind than he might have wished, and he has been attempting to mute that ever since. Certainly the Berlin stories also include the personal element, and it is to those concerns that he has turned in his later writings—but always for their wider implications, be they religious or sexual. He is both the most personal of writers—if in the last analysis purposefully elusive—and one who is ever interested in the greater significance of an individual's experience.

CERTAINLY HIS FAMILY has been central to Isherwood's writings. In his early work he seemed determined to exorcise as best he could his family's traditions and the influence of the past, particularly of his mother. As he was perhaps too hard on her in his early writings, he almost seems to be too hard on himself, and too indulgent toward her, in later books; especially in his study of her, his father, and himself, *Kathleen and Frank* (1971). In his family there is also the shadowy figure of his brother Richard, the one person Isherwood requested Finney not to approach. And yet the "brother theme," extremely important in *A Meeting by the River*, deserves exploration. It is impressive and intriguing that there should be a private aspect to the life, which has neither been dissected by the writer himself in his memoirs nor in the recent biographies.

The discussion of Isherwood's early career is well done in this book: Finney makes clear how important was the meeting with W. H. Auden in 1925 (or rather remeeting, as they had been at prep school together) and with E.M. Forster in 1926. The former led to a highly important collaboration on three plays—*The Dog Beneath the Skin* (1935), *The Ascent of F6* (1936), and *On the Frontier* (1938)—which Finney tends slightly to underrate. The latter meeting led to a fictional breakthrough, and Isherwood's adoption of Forster's technique of "tea-tabling," of describing the most dramatic events as if they were tidbits of trivial conversation during a tea party. Probably the most famous example in Forster is the polite, ferocious beginning of the fifth chapter of *The Longest Journey*: "Gerald died that afternoon." Isherwood's work has that sense of genteel menace as well.

But the 1930s period is already clear enough to those who know Isherwood's work, and Finney does better service in his discussion of the years

Now Available:

E Pluribus Unum
The Formation of the American Republic 1776-1790
By Forrest McDonald

Having won their independence from England, the American colonies faced a new question of paramount importance: Would this be politically one nation, or would it not? *E Pluribus Unum* is a provocative and spirited look at how that question came to be answered. "A fresh, vivid, and penetrating recreation of the crucial fourteen years in which a new nation was born"—*New York Times Book Review*. "Original and stimulating"—*American Historical Review*. "Highly readable and highly recommended"—*Library Journal*. "Will lead scholars to reassess some of their assumptions about the formative years of the American republic. As one of the most sprightly written brief accounts of this turbulent era it is also likely to gain a non-academic audience"—*Annals of the American Academy*. Hardcover $8.00, Paperback $3.50.

LibertyPress LibertyClassics

We pay postage, but require prepayment, on orders from individuals. Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. To order this book, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
LibertyPress/LibertyClassics
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. E3
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

since 1939, about which Isherwood himself has not written so thoroughly. He copes with the disappointing return to fiction, after a long absence, in *The World in the Evening* (1954), the first novel drawing upon his American experience: Isherwood had yet to establish a tone and point of view appropriate to his material. In fact, it took him quite a while to find his new voice in the New World, but in *Down There on a Visit* (1962), *A Meeting by the River* (1967), and most importantly in *A Single Man* (1964), he moved into his second major phase. Finney writes of these novels intelligently, and with the seriousness they deserve. But one would have welcomed more specific contrasting between the writings of the various periods: *The Berlin Stories*, say, compared to *A Single Man*. In the former there is the observer Christopher Isherwood and a whole cast of characters who in a composite way tell one about society—mostly expatriate—in Berlin in the early 1930s. There is a complex social sense of the world of relationships, and how the actions of each one affect the others. There is a certain feeling of objectivity, and even if the famous camera point can be exaggerated, the scene is being more observed than participated in.

A Single Man, after Isherwood's religious experience of Vedanta and the calmer assumption of homosexuality, tells of a day in the life of an expatriate English academic whose lover, Jim, has recently been killed in an automobile accident. There is the universality of the figure, coming out of sleep and returning to it at the end of the day—life and death—and there is the particularity of the individual, and the brilliance of the scenes in his day: talking in class about Huxley's *After Many A Summer Dies the Swan*, dinner with his fellow expatriate Charlotte, and a drunken swim with his student Kenny—part of a relationship with an undercurrent of sexuality, but involving also the reflective nature of age and the openness of the California young. The experiences of the day are seen from the inside out, from within George rather than from the point of view of Christopher in Berlin, looking on. The cast of characters has been replaced by a single man, looking out. Both books are casual and funny, wonderfully written, but England has been assimilated into America, and quite a different vision and world have emerged.

In his most recent book, *Christopher and his Kind* (1976), Isherwood has tried to rewrite his past to give it a sexual rather than a political focus. Of course it has both; the sexual aspect is itself political as well. His earlier version of Berlin was an attack on the barbarous right-wing politics of the 1930s. But his commitment to homosexual culture is also a political stance. He depicts his homosexuality as a deliberate way of being a member of a minority, as standing against the acknowledged values of the England in which he grew up. Finney makes this point very well. One has at times a faint feeling that Isherwood somewhat regrets the more liberal attitude of today, that there wasn't more of a fuss when he first discussed his homosexuality openly on television in 1972. As Finney remarks, "He can only write out of a sense of foreignness and alienation." Perched in Santa Monica, he is able to thrive in the friendly anonymity of California.

Isherwood's continual playing with his own personality in so many of his writings, using it and going beyond it in varying ways with such skill, makes it very difficult for a biographer to deal with him. No book so far manages to come close, in style and frequently, indeed, in insight, to the books written by the subject himself, though this one is useful.

There are a good many acute perceptions in Finney's study; even so, few are at the level of a previously unpublished poem of 1937 by W. H. Auden, given in an appendix, which depicts Isherwood as "A cross between a cavalry major and a rather prim landlady." Auden conveys a sense of a wanderer who is a great stylist, a wit, and a perceiver of personality and its discontents:

Standing here in Dover under the cliffs
with dotty England behind you
And challenging the provocative sea
With your enormous distinguished
nose and your great grey eyes
Only 33 and a real diplomat already
Our great ambassador to the mad.

Use your will. We need it.

That concluding line was an appeal—an admonition—to which Isherwood listened then; to which, one likes to think, he is listening now. As much as ever, we need his will, his understanding, his truth, and his art. ❏

COVER-UP: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941-1946, by Bruce R. Bartlett. Arlington House, 189 pp., $8.95.

Backdoor to war

ROBERT SHERRILL

GRANDIOSE PLANS ARE under way for a Franklin Delano Roosevelt memorial at the west end of the Tidal Basin in Washington, D.C., but Congress, showing much more than its customary savvy, has not yet authorized money for the memorial.

The delay makes good sense, and it will continue to make good sense until the nation finishes sorting out its feelings about FDR; finishes measuring what his disciples claimed he did for (or to) us against what he actually did. The myth of Roosevelt as the savior of a depressed nation has been pretty thoroughly debunked. The welfare capitalism of his New Deal, his Keynesian orgy, has left us with a federal government dedicated to waste and corruption and corporate favoritism. The regulatory "reforms" of the New Deal for a long time have been seen as mainly benefiting big businessmen and their lawyers. C. Wright Mills was probably correct when he said that FDR's main achievement was in fobbing the people off with just enough help to defuse what might have turned into a drive for genuine economic reforms. In any event, nothing could be plainer than FDR's success in pulling us out of the Depression only by pushing us into war.

Which is the second area that should be more fully explored before asking the taxpayers to spend money on FDR memorials. Could we have stayed out of World War II if we had been spared Roosevelt's machinations, and would we have been a happier and more secure nation today if we had done so?

ROBERT SHERRILL is the author of The Last Kennedy: Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, Before and After Chappaquiddick, *and is Washington editor of* The Nation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Did Roosevelt use not merely unfair but downright foul means to get us into the war?

Cover-Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941–1946 attempts to answer both of those questions, but mainly the second one.

Before getting into the substance of the book, let me urge you not to draw the wrong conclusions from some of the book's trappings. True, Arlington House is a right-wing publishing company, but this book might just as easily have been published by Beacon Press, a left-wing publishing house. The cover blurb pulls some of that smug, right-wing flippancy—"No, Virginia, it didn't start with Watergate"—and the old Cold Warrior John Chamberlain, in his useless foreword, comes on with the same honk, arguing that some of FDR's actions were "precisely on a par with Nixon's in the Watergate cover-up. . . ."

In fact, if Roosevelt was guilty of provoking Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor and guilty of failing to warn our military commanders in Hawaii to be alert for an attack that he knew was coming—which is what Bruce R. Bartlett sets out to discover—then only a very stupid person would refer to any part of such crimes as "on a par" with the comparative trivia of Watergate. Bartlett, who is anything but stupid, deserves better company. *Cover-Up* (a lousy title, for it deals with much more) strikes me as a thorough, low-keyed, fair, and completely nonpartisan review of the Presidential actions that led at least indirectly to the death of twenty-five hundred men and women at Pearl Harbor and three hundred thousand U.S. citizens in World War II.

THE PLOT: ROOSEVELT wanted to take us into the European war as active participants, but, having promised during his 1940 campaign that he would not send Americans to fight in foreign wars, he felt it would be somewhat unseemly to break his word so soon unless we were attacked. On several occasions he tried to provoke the Germans to attack our military craft at sea, but drawing us into the war was the last thing Hitler wanted to do at that moment; our efforts to pick a fight were futile. So Roosevelt turned to the Pacific, and our relations with Japan, to seek a backdoor entry into the war.

Japan, which had signed a tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy (but wasn't working very hard at being an ally), had been bullying its way around China and Southeast Asia for some time. Late in July 1941, stung by Japanese aggression in Indochina, the United States persuaded Britain (and the Dutch) to join us in freezing Japanese funds—thus, with one stroke, depriving Japan of three-quarters of its foreign trade and nearly nine-tenths of its supplies of oil.

Needless to say, this placed Japan in an unbearable predicament. It was an action that frightened our top brass almost as much as it shocked the Japanese. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Admiral Harold Stark, chief of naval operations, definitely did not desire a two-front war; they wanted only to help England and France. In a November 5, 1941, memo to FDR (quoted by Bartlett), they argued that if Roosevelt could stall the Japanese with diplomatic games, even until February or March, the Pacific defenses might be made impressive enough to convince the Japanese they should not start a war.



But Roosevelt was adamant. Though twice—on November 7 and again on November 20—the Japanese pressed earnestly for negotiations, promising major changes in their military posture, Roosevelt would not even discuss the issue. He flatly told them that if they wanted our trade and our oil, they would have to accept our total package of demands at once: get out of China and Indochina completely and immediately, and recognize the sovereignty of Chiang throughout China. He had clearly given them an ultimatum they would not accept. Indeed, the Japanese could not accept it because they felt their national destiny was at stake. Japan either had to have our trade and oil, or it had to strike soon for the oil, rubber, tin, and bauxite in Malaya, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. And to guarantee that its strike would be successful, Japan would have to make certain that our fleet was crippled. Roosevelt had made this inevitable.

Our policy was not created in ignorance. In August 1940, army cryptologists had broken the Japanese code—the "Purple Code." After that, U.S. policymakers knew immediately what was in all of the supposedly secret Japanese diplomatic messages. "No longer," writes Bartlett, "can we simply assume that the provocations against Japan were merely shortsighted. We assume that President Roosevelt and the State Department knew precisely what they were doing and knew that war would be the result."

On November 5, 1941, Tokyo cabled Ambassador Nomura in Washington that if the two countries did not reach an agreement "by the 25th of this month" relations would fall "into a chaotic condition." Secretary of State Cordell Hull later admitted that when he saw the transcript of that secret message he knew it "could mean only one thing. Japan had already set in motion the wheels of her war machine, and she had decided not to stop short of war with the United States if by November 25 we had not agreed to her demands."

On November 22, still trying to get some agreement from Washington that would avert war, Tokyo cabled Nomura it was extending the November 25 deadline to November 29, but it warned: "This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."

All of our top policymakers knew what that cryptic final phrase meant. Bartlett quotes from the diary of Secretary of War Henry Stimson relating to a November 25 meeting at the White House: "There the President . . . brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into . . . firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."

I HAVE WRITTEN THE ABOVE in such a way as to suggest that Roosevelt, wanting to get us into the European war through the Asian backdoor, *conspired* to force Japan to attack Pearl Harbor, and calculatingly left Pearl Harbor so vulnerable as to make the attack a success. But Bartlett would not be in complete agreement with my suggestion. He stops short of the conspiracy theory. Indeed, he is even willing to let Roosevelt off the hook for his failure to properly alert our commanders at Pearl Harbor, observing, "it is not clear that he or anyone else in the government knew exactly where the attack would take place. Of all American territory in the Pacific, the Philippines were considered the most likely Japanese target, not Pearl Harbor. Although there was evidence to suggest that Pearl might be attacked, there is nothing in the available record indicating that anyone in high authority was aware of this until it was too late. . . .

"Thus, in the final analysis, we must say that Roosevelt's guilt consisted not in a conspiracy to set up the fleet but in pursuing a policy he knew would lead to war and in failing to be honest about his intentions both before and after the attack."

Bartlett is striving so hard to be fair that he short-circuits some of his own evidence to the contrary. There may be no absolute proof that Roosevelt set up the fleet for the attack, but there is considerable material in Bartlett's own book tending in that direction. For example, Bartlett acknowledges that navy planners "knew that Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to surprise attack by aircraft carriers, a fact that had been demonstrated as early as 1932 in the Navy's annual maneuvers. Despite this, in 1940 the Pacific Fleet was moved by presidential order from its permanent base in San Diego to Pearl Harbor. . . ." When Admiral James O. Richardson, commander of the Pacific Fleet, virtually demanded of FDR that the fleet be returned to San Diego for a proper preparation for war, he was relieved of his command.

There is no absolute proof that FDR set up the fleet for attack, but the evidence points in that direction.

In early 1941, about the time Richardson was being silenced by FDR, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, our man in Tokyo, sent the following dispatch to Washington: "My Peruvian Colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities."

Other intercepted Japanese messages strongly suggested that Pearl would be attacked. For example, Tokyo sent its consulate in Honolulu a message on September 24, 1941—with two messages of amplification before the attack—ordering information that officials in Washington immediately recognized as the making of a coordinate grid system to be used in a bombing attack. "These three messages," Bartlett claims, "added up to what was very nearly a dead giveaway that Pearl would be the target of a Japanese air attack."

As to the probable time for the Japanese attack, that could have been reasonably deduced by Washington. Bartlett explains: ". . . in the first week of December 1941 the United States intercepted a number of messages to various Japanese diplomatic missions ordering them to destroy their code machines. Historically this is a move that shortly precedes the outbreak of war." Thus, it was plain that the attack would come within a few days after the destruct orders were issued on Monday, December 1.

Furthermore, during the following Saturday night and early Sunday morning (December 6–7), Washington intercepted a fourteen-part message that the Japanese ambassador was told to present to the President, in reply to the U.S. ultimatum, at precisely 1 P.M. Washington time—7:30 A.M. Honolulu time. Washington's reaction was not naive. After reading the first thirteen parts, Roosevelt said to an aide, "This means war." As for the timing of the delivery, top brass of both army and navy interpreted that to indicate the probable time of attack.

WERE THE ARMY AND navy commandants in Honolulu alerted to what was going on? Yes and no. They had not been informed of the contents of any of the broken Japanese cables as they came into Washington. Almost to the last, they were not told in detail the gravity of the diplomatic dispute.

They were not informed of the bomb-grid messages.

However, they were not totally without warning. On November 27, Washington sent a message to Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commander of the army's Hawaiian department, warning him that negotiations with the Japanese "appeared" to be terminated and that "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment." He was ordered to "undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary . . ." In another message from army G-2 (intelligence) Short was further warned that "subversive activities may be expected." G-2 did not—*not*—warn him of a potential attack but only of potential sabotage. To warn Short that hostile action was "possible at any moment" was very misleading; Washington knew (as the army's Pearl Harbor Board investigators later put it, in the harshest terms) that hostile action *somewhere* was "absolutely imminent. . . . The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction of this information."

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commander of the Pacific Fleet, stationed at Pearl Harbor, had also been given some warning. On November 27 Stark had sent him a message specifically identified as a "war warning." In it Stark said "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days," but Stark added that in his opinion the attack would be against the Philippines. Stark did not say that Washington believed Hawaii was a potential target.

Short and Kimmel showed incredible sloppiness and lack of imagination in the defense and watchfulness they provided Pearl Harbor. Kimmel deserves extra blame because, as Bartlett points out, "For years Navy planners had assumed that upon the outbreak of war with Japan, the Japanese would strike at the Pacific Fleet wherever it was located."

Still, having said that, we are simply saying that a couple of army and navy brass were slow-witted, a fairly common characteristic of the brass both then and now. They were not so slow-witted, however, that they would not have responded quickly if they had been given direct orders from Washington to do so.

On December 7, General Marshall sent the first and only substantial warning to General Short, that "The Japanese are presenting at one P.M. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately . . ." Marshall ordered Short to "be on alert accordingly." Strangely, the message was not sent from Washington until 11:52, less than an hour and a half before the first bombs fell. Furthermore, it was sent by just plain old commercial telegraph, and arrived in Honolulu after the attack was underway. "Why Marshall did not use a scrambler telephone or high-power radio transmitter," writes Bartlett, "has never been explained."

So Roosevelt got his war at last; perhaps not exactly the way he would have preferred — only a madman would have wanted to buy a war with the virtual annihilation of our battleship fleet, as occurred at Pearl Harbor. Still, who can say what mental state Roosevelt was in? He had just been elected to a third term, the first (and last) President so honored, and he unquestionably was suffering from delusions of grandeur. Later congressional efforts to get to the bottom of the Pearl Harbor disaster were blocked and hampered by the Roosevelt and Truman administrations (thus the "cover-up" title).

ALL ADMIRERS OF ROOSEvelt, and even many of his critics, will contend that how or why he manipulated us into World War II really doesn't matter because it was inevitable that we would eventually get in, and the sooner the better, for the cause was just and the results noble. It is time we begin seriously to question that old argument. Far from being noble, the results of World War II, like the effluence of Love Canal, have poisoned our earth seemingly forever. Most of the negative forces that make our national life so unhappy and irrational—the military-industrial waste, the impenetrable federal budget, the "national security" hysteria that is supposed to excuse FBI excesses, the covert insanity of the CIA, the incredibly unwieldy federal bureaucracy, the flatulent patriotism of our educators—became permanent fixtures with World War II.

As for the worth of our military intervention, Bartlett rightly questions it—and even more properly questions the worth of any military intervention. "It is impossible to say what would have happened if Roosevelt had not goaded the Japanese into attacking the United States," he writes. "Perhaps the interventionists would have been proven correct, with Germany and Japan dominating the globe. This is highly unlikely, considering that Germany was already losing the war in the USSR by December 1941. . . . If the Soviet Union, with its vastly greater strength, has not yet conquered the world, chances are the Axis could not have done so either. . . .

"[T]o one way of thinking, had the U.S. never intervened in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam we would now be little worse off in the international arena, and perhaps even better off. . . . In the process we would have saved thousands upon thousands of lives and billions upon billions of dollars. . . .

"[We] must include in the final cost of the Pearl Harbor attack not only the lives of those who died on December 7, 1941, but of all those who have died since as the result of American intervention in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and all the other engagements associated with the Cold War."

That last sentence should be allowed some place on the proposed FDR memorial, just to keep the engraved flattery in perspective. ❑

THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE, by Bernard Frieden. MIT Press, 211 pp., $12.50.

Locking out the poor

TOM HAZLETT

IN CITY HALLS ALL OVER America, there lurks today a powerful special interest group. It condemns hundreds of thousands of lower- and middle-class families to life in ghettos and substandard neighborhoods. It deprives the nation's young people of the chance to buy homes. It creates urban-suburban sprawl and air pollution. And it is helping to line the pockets of the established upper classes.

This special interest group is the environmental protection lobby.

Such lurid accusations are not tossed out lightly in Bernard Frieden's *The Environmental Protection Hustle*; rather, their truth is convincingly demonstrated. A professor of urban studies and planning at MIT and formerly the director of the MIT-Harvard joint center for urban studies, Frieden spent a sabbatical at the University of California, Berkeley, studying the massive ramifications of the San Francisco Bay area's environmental policies. Long touted as the nation's "leader" in environmental policing, the locale offered a superb vantage point for observing the consequences of zealous local land-use controls. Frieden did not waste the opportunity.

While Sierra Club types gloat over the legal and political triumphs that halted what Frieden estimates to be 15 to 20 percent of the bay area's housing construction each year, they blithely ignore the costs of this "protection." Not Frieden. "The new politics of no growth," he writes, "have raised costs by creating delays, uncertainties and expensive revisions in plans." He is bold enough to correlate the regulatory squeeze with the housing price

TOM HAZLETT is a graduate student in economics at UCLA and a member of the staff of the International Institute for Economic Research.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crunch, noting: "In 1970 nearly half the families in the country were able to buy the median-priced new or old home while still keeping total housing expenses to not more than 25 percent of their incomes. By 1976, using the same standard, only one family in four could afford the monthly cost of a median-priced new home . . ."

Most striking in this calm and well-documented work are the specific case studies of major housing developments that could have provided new and marvelous living opportunities for thousands of the nonrich, had there been no regulatory guillotine. Finding such "horror stories" was the least of Frieden's problems; northern California, he claims, "is a graveyard of big development proposals." One cadaver is the plan for the Mountain Village project in Oakland. Originating on the drawing boards of an Alcoa subsidiary in 1971, the planned community was designed for 1080 townhouses and 1080 condominiums averaging $28,625 in price. To protect the delicate Oakland ecosystem, 70 percent of the land was to be dedicated as open space. The project was in compliance with the strict development guidelines issued by the Oakland City Council three years previously.

Then came the regulatory process. The city planning department report posed the question that was to set the tone for subsequent hearings: "Even if, upon analysis, it were found that there would be few negative implications resulting from this proposal, . . . would it not be better to retain the total area as open space?"

Hearings followed. Hearings mean delays, delays raise costs, and mounting costs make developers nervous. All of which led to a "resolution of the problem":

> In February, 1976 [the developers] submitted a rough version of a new plan to the city. Originally they had proposed building some 2,200 housing units on the site. Now they proposed building from 150 to 200 single-family homes and dividing the rest of the land into 100 lots ranging in size from three to fifteen acres, which would sell for estate homes. City officials discussed the new plan informally with neighborhood opponents and Sierra Club representatives and brought back the word that they would no longer oppose it.

The new Sierra Club–approved price tag? A $50,000 average for the 150 to 200 homes (nearly double the previous price for 2160 units), and an average $205,000 for one of the estates. "What started out as middle

income housing came out instead as luxury homes."

But hold onto your pine tree, because the most ironic part of the deal was that the citizens of Oakland lost a public park. "The original proposal offered the city of Oakland 480 acres of open space for recreation. The compromise plan carved up almost all this land into private homesites, making bigger lots for the reduced number of families who would buy or build homes there. It was true that the new plan preserved more open space from development, but at the same time it closed that land to the public."

*FRIEDEN INCISIVELY DIS*sects the regulatory process itself and analyzes the politics of public hearings. He repeatedly points to the bias inherent in them, a bias against housing development that he attributes to the fact that the potential beneficiaries—the eventual home-buyers—are only an abstraction at the time the hearings are staged. He describes nine years of proceedings that killed 12,500 units of middle-class housing in San Bruno:

> This process did give reasonably balanced consideration to issues that organized groups within the county considered important. Housing needs were left out because they did not have an organized local constituency. The people who would have lived in new housing were scattered throughout the entire region. Until houses were available for them, there was no way of even identifying who they were. People who wanted to buy or rent new houses had the greatest stake in the decision, but they were unorganized, probably unorganizable, and without local influence.

When Frieden reports on the validity of technical studies and of the venerated Environmental Impact Reports in this area, it's as if he were stripping a saint. Buzzwords and conjectures, he finds, are the essentials of the typical EIR. He relates an instance in which a several-thousand-unit development was questioned in terms of its impact on the ever-popular bald eagle. Of the national bird's forty landing pads in the Golden State, none were located in even the same county as the project. Still the ecology experts were forced to conclude that "it's a possibility that they fly over the project area."

The bottom line on the environmental movement is that it has nothing to do with protecting the environment. An outstanding insight of Frieden's is that those who make a profession out of lowering our expectations have passed death sentences on developments that were very promising from an environmental standpoint—that would have housed people close to urban job centers and adjacent to mass transit lines (some developers even run buses to nearby terminals), while providing complementary parks, recreation, and open space. In so doing they have necessarily forced the families who would have lived in these ecologically rather progressive situations to outlying suburban areas where longer commuting distances will add to traffic, smog, and the Sierra Club nightmare: suburban sprawl.

Implicit in the arguments of growth controllers is that nobody needs more housing. Frieden notes that two massive and authoritative documents on land use in California, one private and the other governmental, deal with the question of the need for more and better housing by devoting to it, respectively, two pages and zero pages. The implications for the poor and middle class, for all of those who have not yet made it to the last place they ever hope to live in, are hardly obscure. It is the class conflict thus fostered that is the most dramatic aspect of the debate over land-use controls. As Frieden uninhibitedly observes: "One problem

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with this new political alliance [between environmentalists and local, established interests] is that it lends the legitimacy of an environmental crusade in the public interest to what is otherwise a selfish and provincial concern . . ."

As for the Sierra Club, its class character is very significant indeed:

> A recent survey of Sierra Club membership showed that fully two-thirds of the main wage earners in members' households came from the following occupational groups: lawyers, doctors, dentists, other professionals, college teachers and other teachers, managers and executives, and engineers. More than half the members have had some postgraduate education, with 18 percent having a Ph.D., law, or medical degree, and 21 percent a master's degree.
>
> This is not a typical cross-section of people who buy homes in new tract developments. Highly educated professionals and executives can usually afford the high cost of a house in an established, desirable suburb with an attractive environment. Their opposition to homebuilding is usually opposition to someone else's opportunity to buy a moderate-cost house. And the environment they protect is an environment they can afford to enjoy. The Sierra Club membership survey spoke clearly about whether its members were concerned with everyone's environment or only with their own. When asked, "Should the Club concern itself with the conservation problems of such special groups as the urban poor and ethnic minorities?," 58 percent of the members answered that they either strongly or "somewhat" opposed such involvement.

Frieden's book is not without flaws. He should for instance patch up his price theory: "Cost-push" does not determine the price (costs affect price, of course, but only by influencing the available supply), and speculators do not affect the level of market prices in the long run, but merely help prices to adjust to their true supply and demand values faster. But Frieden's contributions are broad, innovative, and more than enough to compensate for these goofs. He is not afraid, moreover, to tie the environmental protection hustle to the general regulatory rip-off. In doing so, he makes a fascinating distinction between the old, dingy, and obviously nefarious agencies, staffed by industry yes-men quivering in the face of The Interests, and the new breed of self-righteous incorruptibles who kowtow only to their fellow true believers. The do-gooders, Frieden shows, have plundered the average American even more successfully than did the do-badders. This book just might make you nostalgic for the bad old days. ❧

FILM

***HAIR*, directed by Milos Forman.**

The party's over

STEPHEN HARVEY

AT THE TAIL END OF THE long-gone sixties, Hollywood repeatedly tripped over its own well-shod feet in trying to catch up with the barefoot disciples of the Now Generation. A series of flaccid movies paid groveling tribute to the young—mainly because that presumably was where the money was—while failing utterly to grasp what the hubbub was really about. One of the few trendy entries that made any sense at all was Milos Forman's first American effort, *Taking Off*, in which his observant gaze surveyed a landscape of suburban matrons and pinstripers and their moon-eyed runaways with an evenhanded measure of irony and affection.

As an outsider only recently emigrated from Czechoslovakia, Forman possessed the emotional distance needed to view the subject dispassionately, finding warps in the social fabric that his American colleagues were unable to see. In fact, Forman's gift for perceiving well-meaning absurdity on both sides of the generation gap (remember the generation gap?) backfired, at least from a commercial standpoint. Unlike a number of those movies that came out firmly on the side of the Day-Glo angels, *Taking Off* was a financial disaster, and it took several years for Forman to find the backing for another project.

Then came *Cuckoo's Nest*, and we all know how that turned out. And now there's *Hair*, which, thematically speaking, brings Forman back more or less to where he started from. Yet I'm afraid that *Taking Off* is destined to remain his most valid testament to that tie-dyed era all the same. To the probable corporate joy of United Artists, which backed *Hair* to the tune of twelve million dollars plus, this movie is simply the sixties viewed through rose-colored granny glasses. This tribute to antimaterialism is likely to keep its producers in Cartier love-beads for the rest of their lives, and with good reason—in terms of sheer energy, buoyancy, and imagination it does more to resuscitate the movie musical than all the song-and-dance duds of the last five years combined. Few recent movies of any genre could boast as many moments of real pleasure as this affords.

Nevertheless, somehow, *Hair* leaves you feeling unfulfilled once all the revelry has ended. Its surface brilliance is nothing to scoff at, but all the filmic razzle-dazzle in the world can't quite compensate for the absence of a unified and distinct point of view—if only everyone involved had refrained from searching for new ways of being clever just long enough to think about what they wanted to make of the material they'd taken on for themselves.

If there was one aspect of this property that should have been exploited to the hilt, it was the fact that its aggressive air of contemporaneity ten years ago makes it such an utter period piece today. *Hair* no longer has the power either to shock or to proselytize, because the raunchy innocence it sought to celebrate now looks merely quaint at best—rather like the skylarks of an earlier and equally self-romanticized "Lost Generation." In retrospect, the real poignancy of the sixties was the very transience of the mood that marked those times: The notion that its cultural reverberations would resound forever was the greatest delusion of all. It's impossible to look at the show's assembled archetypes of hippiedom in the same way now as audiences did back in 1968—how can you really sustain a note of jubilance when you know that what you're celebrating is long since extinct? More to the point, what might have seemed sweet and ingenuous (at least to some) in those distant times is bound to have more complex overtones nowadays.

STEPHEN HARVEY is INQUIRY's film reviewer. He is coordinator of the film study program, Museum of Modern Art, New York City.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ONE OF THE LEAST ATTRACTIVE attributes of the youthquake of yore was its smug self-righteousness, yet the movie doesn't really comment any further on the mores extolled in the original play—it merely replicates them. Youth still represents untrammeled purity of soul and idealism of spirit, while age and/or any form of social conformity carries the indelible taint of stone-hearted venality. You're still supposed to think that our communal heroes' efforts to *épater le bourgeois*—breaking up a suburban *fête champêtre*, stripping the clothes and stealing a car from some dumb military drudge—are simply cute and disarming because their targets are somehow less than human, and therefore don't count. Meanwhile, sweet kids pass out acid cubes in the park, and all is unmitigated rapture.

What's really curious is that while such attitudes are allowed to survive intact, the visual trappings that surround them are strangely out of sync. The weightless, ever-precise elasticity of Twyla Tharp's choreography, however exuberant, bears little resemblance to the earthy anarchy of sixties' popular dance—even the clothes and makeup of this chorus of meticulously drilled would-be Be-In kids often smack more of Soho boutique chic than sixties thriftshop funk.

Part of the confusion, I think, stems from the cross-purposes imposed on Michael Weller's script—the desire to preserve the freewheeling melodic flow of the original while beefing up the story sufficiently to fulfill a movie audience's expectation of a semblance of plot, and broadening the visual horizons beyond the confines of the stage.

The Broadway *Hair* was little more than a series of lyric soliloquies and chorales bounded by the walls of an East Village crash pad. The movie airily spans the continent as it follows the odyssey of rawboned, upstanding Claude (John Savage) from the Oklahoma prairie to Manhattan and his impending military induction. Venturing hesitantly into Central Park, he is dazzled by the sight of the dewy debutante Sheila (Beverly D'Angelo), then befriended and enlightened by the life-affirming Berger (Treat Williams) and his ethnically and sexually balanced retinue—one black (Dorsey Wright), one platinum-haired androgyne (Don Dacus), and one wistfully expectant—in more ways than one—groupie (Annie Golden). Together with Claude, these footloose naifs pursue Sheila to the verdant wilds of split-level New Jersey; when he's drafted, they venture to the Nevada desert to cheer him up during basic training.

This frail narrative is both too much and not enough. Although the list of principals has been considerably streamlined, there are too many ensemble musical detours to leave the characters enough time to take root beyond the emblematic stage—they and the young performers impersonating them are a congenial bunch, but never individually very arresting. At the same time, the writing is so flavorless that as the movie winds down, the script consists of little more than a series of arid pauses between those juicy numbers—surprising, considering that Weller's *Moonchildren* was the most vivid and telling of all the theatrical elegies to the sixties.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IT'S ALL SO FRIVOLOUS AND insubstantial in texture that when the movie does try, belatedly, for a patina of seriousness, it comes too late to be anything but a perfunctory afterthought. The tableaux of the macabre legacy of our Vietnam misadventure—a sea of helmets disappearing into the dark maw of a transport plane, and then an ocean of anonymous white crosses—are beautifully rendered but they don't go far enough. The film ends with masses of mournful protesters decrying the carnage, which implies that the Age of Aquarius would truly dawn once Vietnam was behind us. But the sad truth was that while the war fed the ferment of the time, its conclusion sounded the death knell for the sixties once and for all; the quiet on the war front was soon to breed conformity at home.

But then, logic is not this film's strong suit anyway—if it were, Claude would have faced the draft board in unsullied Tulsa rather than decadent Gotham, and his autumnal park encounter wouldn't be followed a few scenes and a handful of on-screen days later by a Happening taking place amid what is obviously the first blush of spring.

Yet, paradoxically, *Hair*'s lackadaisical abstraction is finally not only its greatest limitation, but also its most delightful feature. Its patchwork collage form may handicap *Hair*'s sense of drama and social pertinence, but it's a wonderful concept for a rousing escapist musical. *Hair* doesn't mask the incongruities inherent in the movie musical genre—it positively embraces them. Nobody is concerned about making the songs and plot mesh in a "believable" way—the music surges through every fissure, and Forman makes the numbers take flight with a momentum that accelerates the drive of Galt MacDermot's now familiar score.

There may never have been a musical adapted from the stage which so exulted in the movies' freedom from the rigid boundaries of space and time imposed by the theater. The camerawork and editing contribute as much to the shape and cadence of the songs as do the melodies themselves, creating a world in which everything we see can be shaped to harmonize with the music we're hearing. An Afro-haloed soprano belts her rhapsody to the Age of Aquarius, and we whirl around her in an ecstatic 360-degree sweep; Berger and troupe let loose with a rambunctious ditty and the steeds bearing New York's Finest prance and canter in unison. The whimsically carnal "White Boys, Black Boys" takes its cue from a vignette of draftees stripping for inspection, then flashes between lusty trios of white and black girls in the park, and spit-and-polish army brass admiring the spoils of war.

Forman's visual metaphors for MacDermot's rhymed tales in miniature are by and large so apt and witty that the few misfires are that much more conspicuous: In obvious desperation to find the right slot for the title number, he illustrates this ode to hirsuteness with, of all incongruous things, a stylized jailhouse rumble. Sometimes, too, the performers get swamped by all the gimmickry and pizazz, but Forman knows how to leave well enough alone when he has someone really special to showcase. Here it is Cheryl Barnes, a singer of deceptively prim demeanor with a voice like a sunburst. When she lays fervent siege to the plaintive "Easy to Be Hard" you don't want to be distracted from such radiance for an instant, and the rapt closeups with which Forman frames her bring the excitement to the boiling point.

At moments such as this, *Hair* embodies the liberating high proclaimed by the play more exhilaratingly than the original ever did. I would have been satisfied if last year's *The Wiz*, *Sergeant Pepper*, or *Grease* had displayed even a particle of the taste and mastery of this movie. Yet, as a saga of a vanished time (as opposed to *Grease*, which in its "Laverne and Shirley" way celebrates something that never actually existed), *Hair* needed more than a handful of glittering fragments to make it a truly satisfying movie. Like its blithely oblivious heroes, *Hair* is all dressed up in multicolored raiments, but it doesn't really go anywhere. ❑

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED ADVERTISING RATES: $0.25 PER WORD, MINIMUM INSERTION $5.00. SIX TO 11 insertions: 10 percent off; 12 or more insertions: 20 percent off. Payment must accompany insertion order: INQUIRY, 1700 Montgomery St., San Francisco, CA 94111. Copy should be received 30 days before each semimonthly cover date. INQUIRY reserves the right to refuse advertisements that we consider to be of questionable taste or intent. Additional information regarding advertising rates or terms will be sent upon request.

Publications

*ENJOY! SERVE! EIGHT HEALTHFUL, AL*coholic drinks! Expert reveals nutrition secrets, recipes! Rush $1.00 ("Refundable!"). Gourmet, 5133-J Fairhill, Philadelphia, PA 19120.

SUBSCRIBE TO THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN Employment Newsletter!! Current openings—all occupations!! Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming!! Write today for free details to Intermountain-4W, 3506 Birch, Cheyenne, WY 82001.

FREE! MOST COMPLETE CATALOG OF Ruling Class/Conspiracy Scholarship. Sample *Conspiracy Digest* $2.95. Alpine Enterprises, Box 766, Dearborn, MI 48121.

READ THE GUARDIAN, #1 INDEPENDENT radical U.S. newsweekly. National, international coverage. Special introductory offer 6 weeks—$1. Write *Guardian*, Dept. IQ, 33 W. 17th Street, NYC 10011.

NO TIME TO READ? LITERATURE OF Liberty is your magazine. A quarterly journal abstracting important articles from nearly 400 journals—international in scope. Each issue features a bibliographical essay and 100 abstracts in Philosophy, Political Science, Law, Economics, History, and more. $12/4 issues. *Literature of Liberty*, Box I, 1700 Montgomery St., San Francisco, CA 94111.

Merchandise

WOODEN LAWN, PATIO, BALCONY, AND den furniture; commercial quality, completely finished, weatherproof, and shipped in an unassembled form. York Mfg. Ltd., Dept. IM, 401 West Superior, Chicago, IL 60610.

FINE WALKING STICKS AND CANES. FREE color brochure, Marchele Co., Dept. Y, 720 Fort Washington Ave., New York, NY 10040.

TREASURE HUNT CLUES. YOUR CHILDREN can have lots of fun following my clues to treasures in your own home. You need 8 or 10 clues for each exciting treasure hunt. I'll send you 100 rhymed clues for $3 postpaid and include instructions. You can have many treasure hunts from this collection. Penna. residents add 6% sales tax. Charles O. Harris, P.O. Box 572, Gettysburg, PA 17325.

ANTI-STATIST & LIBERTARIAN BUTTONS, palm-size stickers and posters. I AM NOT A NATIONAL RESOURCE, SUPPORT FREE TRADE—SMUGGLE, HARASS YOUR LOCAL POLITICIAN! Over 50 slogans, also booklets. Free catalog. SLL, Box 4, Fullerton, CA 92633.

Services

BOOK SEARCHING CONTROVERSIAL; Scholarly; Rare; Lists available, all subjects. REGENT HOUSE, 108 N. Roselake, Los Angeles, CA 90026.

Employment

*EARN UP TO $500 PER THOUSAND—STUFF*ing envelopes and mailing. Details 25¢ to: Paul Douglas Co., 4 Van Orden Place, Clifton, NJ 07011.

Miscellaneous

MOTORCYCLE RIDE. THE RIDER WENT off, without a helmet by gosh. Speed increase a lot, The Rider had to quickly stop, without a helmet he was lost. Still a Helmet Law could change his lot. —W. Flaherty.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Come Help Us Celebrate The Child

During the current International Year of the Child, St. Jude Children's Research Hospital continues its desperate search for life-saving knowledge about catastrophic childhood disease.

As the only research center devoted entirely to the conquest of the illnesses that destroy the lives of too many children the world over, St. Jude Hospital celebrates the child with every new finding. And there have been so many.

But each priceless new procedure, even those that have already made some incurable illnesses curable, shows how elusive the ultimate goal of conquest remains.

Research offers the only firm hope.

Research at St. Jude Children's Research Hospital continues because people care. There is no charge to patients or their families once admitted to its research studies by physician referral. The ever increasing cost of drugs, equipment, and research programs has been met primarily by public contributions.

This miraculous celebration of the child knows no race, creed, or financial distinction.

Come, help us celebrate the child. Please send your tax-deductible check or your request for further information to St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, 539 Lane Avenue, Memphis, Tennessee 38105.

ST. JUDE CHILDREN'S RESEARCH HOSPITAL
Danny Thomas, founder

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What this country needs is a magazine with TEETH!

INQUIRY is the national political magazine with teeth... It cuts through the confusion of today's politics and bites hard. That's because INQUIRY is the only magazine that looks at the current political scene with an entirely fresh point of view. While others—liberals and conservatives alike—offer up the same tired, old explanations, INQUIRY has insights and new answers. INQUIRY is an adventure onto new political ground ... where you can find exciting articles by such daring and unpredictable writers as...

- MURRAY N. ROTHBARD on the real story behind the Panama Canal treaty: *The treaty that Wall Street wrote.*
- NOAM CHOMSKY on the question of justice in the Mideast.



- KARL HESS with a civil libertarian's account of West Virginia's textbook controversies.
- DAVID WISE on the Carter administration's ne secrecy legislation: *Toward an Official Secrets Act.*
- DON B. KATES on gun control: *A liberal's argument against a favorite liberal panacea.*
- MARJORIE BOYD on government reorganization: *Carter's big lie.*
- plus regular columns by NAT HENTOFF—"First Amendment Watch"—and THOMAS SZASZ—"The Therapeutic State."
- plus book reviews by such writers as PETER SCHRAG, PENNY LERNOUX, VICTOR MARCHETTI, EUGENE McCARTHY, NOEL PERRIN, ANTHONY BURGESS, and others.

Act now and get the next year of INQUIRY (20 biting issues) for just $12.50.

Yes, send me the next year of INQUIRY for $12.50, half off the regular newsstand price.

☐ 1 yr $12.50 ☐ 2 yrs $22.50 ☐ 3 yrs. $30.00

Name _____

Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Please return to: *INQUIRY*, P.O. Box 2500, Menlo Park, California 94025 or CALL TOLL FREE: 800-621-5809 (In ILLINOIS, 800-972-5858)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED